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hile preparing for trial, defense counsel learns that a 
key prosecution witness has undergone psychotherapy 
or other counseling.  Under what circumstances, if any, should 
counsel be allowed to examine or use records of that therapy or 
counseling to impeach the witness’s testimony?1 
The situation arises most often in sexual-assault or child abuse 
cases, because complainants in such cases often seek, or are 
taken to, counselors of various kinds to help them deal with what 
has happened (or what they claim has happened).  But it also 
arises in a wide range of other criminal cases, for example where 
a key witness in a homicide case has had a lengthy record of 
treatment for various mental and emotional problems, or for 
drug or alcohol abuse.2 
 
1 Access to the records is of course not counsel’s ultimate goal; it is an attempt to 
discover information that can be used to cross-examine the witness at trial, or to 
provide a basis to call the therapist or counselor as a witness and question him or 
her about the witness’s condition and treatment. 
2 See, e.g., Doe v. Diamond, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1992) (extortion); 
United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 89–90 (D. Mass. 2003) (tax fraud); United 
States v. Alperin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (assaulting a federal 
agent); United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225, 1226 (D. Mont. 1997) (murder); 
People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 249–51 (Cal. 2002) (robbery-murder); State v. Peeler, 
857 A.2d 808, 841–44 (Conn. 2004) (murder); State v. Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117, 1124–
W 
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The issue raises profound questions about the conflict 
between various privileges recognized in the law, and a 
defendant’s rights to confront and cross-examine his accusers, to 
use compulsory process to call witnesses, and to due process of 
law.  The only Supreme Court decision on the subject, decided in 
1987, barely scratched the surface.3 
I 
THE ISSUES 
In the ensuing two decades, the law on this subject has 
become an incredible hodgepodge of conflicting approaches and 
procedural conundrums, including the following: 
a. Is the Confrontation Clause applicable to pretrial 
discovery?4 
b. Does it matter whether the privilege on its face is 
conditional or absolute?  If the privilege is absolute, but a court 
determines that the defendant has a constitutional right to the 
information, does the witness nevertheless retain the right to 
insist on the privilege, and if so, how should this affect the 
witness’s testimony at trial?5 
c. Does it matter whether the records in question are in the 
possession of the prosecutor, an unrelated state agency, or a 
private entity?6 
d. Assuming the defendant can overcome the privilege, is 
counsel entitled to examine the records, or only to an in camera 
review of the records by the trial judge, and if so, when?7 
e. What kind of allegation or showing must the defendant 
make to trigger a review of the records?8 
f. Under what circumstances must a judge release relevant 
portions of the records to defense counsel?9 
 
31 (Conn. 1996) (murder); People v. Bean, 560 N.E.2d 258, 269 (Ill. 1990) (murder); 
People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (burglary); State v. 
Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 26–27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (murder). 
3 Ritchie v. Pennsylvania, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion); see infra Part 
III.B. 
4 See infra Part III.B.1. 
5 See infra Part IV.A. 
6 See infra Part IV.B. 
7 See infra Part V.A.1. 
8 See infra Part V.B. 
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This Article describes the current, confused state of the law 
and offers a series of suggestions to bring order out of chaos. 
II 
THE PRIVILEGES 
The issues discussed in this Article arise in connection with a 
variety of privileges, each of which involves communications 
(and records) of therapy or counseling of one kind or another. 
A.  The Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
By the mid-1990s, every state had codified a privilege for 
communications between a patient or client and a psychologist 
or psychiatrist,10 and had also codified a privilege for 
communications between a patient or client and a psychiatric 
social worker.11  In 1996, the Supreme Court, in Jaffee v. 
Redmond,12 held that federal courts likewise must recognize a 
psychotherapist-patient privilege, and held further that the 
privilege covers a patient or client’s confidential communications 
with duly licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, or social workers 
“in the course of psychotherapy.”13  The privilege, the Court 
directed, is absolute, because “[m]aking the promise of 
confidentiality contingent upon a trial judge’s later evaluation of 
the relative importance of the patient’s interest in privacy and 
the evidentiary need for disclosure would eviscerate the 
effectiveness of the privilege.”14 
In Jaffee, the Court made no attempt to “delineate [the] full 
contours” of the privilege,15 other than to recognize that 
circumstances could exist where the privilege “must give way.”16  
That case involved a civil plaintiff’s attempts to obtain a civil 
 
9 See infra Part V.A.4. 
10 For a listing of such provisions, see EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, THE NEW 
WIGMORE:  EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES app. d (2002) (“A State-by-State Survey of 
the Principle Privilege Statutes and Court Rules”). 
11 For a listing of such provisions, see id. 
12 518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
13 Id. at 15. 
14 Id. at 17. 
15 Id. at 18. 
16 Id. at 18 n.19.  As an example, the Court cited a situation in which the only way 
to avert a threat to the patient or others is to reveal the communication.  Id. 
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defendant’s records of psychotherapy.17  Thus, Jaffee provides no 
clear guidance to federal courts where a criminal defendant 
seeks a government witness’s counseling or therapy records.  
Nor does it indicate whether any federal constitutional 
considerations might limit a State’s authority to restrict or forbid 
discovery of otherwise-privileged information in criminal cases. 
B.  Other Privileges 
Counseling specialties have emerged for which similar 
privileges have been created by statute.  Enactment of a 
statutory privilege is important because in many states, the 
counselors are not licensed psychiatrists, psychologists, or social 
workers,18 and therefore do not fall within the traditional doctor-
patient or patient-psychotherapist privileges. 
Many jurisdictions have enacted privileges to protect 
communications made by victims of child abuse, including sexual 
abuse.  These privileges cover communications to counselors 
who attempt to help the child deal with what has happened, and 
also cover communications by other adults to the counselors 
about the abuse. 
Often the counselor is affiliated with a state agency or state-
funded agency affiliated with the court system.  In Pennsylvania 
v. Ritchie,19 the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, 
acknowledged that such a privilege serves important social goals: 
Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and 
prosecute, in large part because there often are no witnesses 
except the victim.  A child’s feelings of vulnerability and guilt 
and his or her unwillingness to come forward are particularly 
acute when the abuser is a parent.  It therefore is essential that 
the child have a state-designated person to whom he may turn, 
and to do so with the assurance of confidentiality.  Relatives 
and neighbors who suspect abuse also will be more willing to 
 
17 Id. at 4. 
18 In Massachusetts, for example, a “sexual assault counselor” is defined as: 
[A] person who is employed by or is a volunteer in a rape crisis center, has 
undergone thirty-five hours of training, who reports to and is under the 
direct control and supervision of a licensed social worker, nurse, 
psychiatrist, psychologist or psychotherapist and whose primary purpose is 
the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to victims of sexual 
assault. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 20J (LexisNexis 2000). 
19 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
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come forward if they know that their identities will be 
protected.  Recognizing this, the Commonwealth–like all 
other States–has made a commendable effort to assure 
victims and witnesses that they may speak to the [state 
agency’s] counselors without fear of general disclosure.
20
 
If such “confidential material had to be disclosed upon demand 
to a defendant charged with criminal child abuse,” the Court 
added, the purpose of the provision would be undermined.21  
According to the Court,“[n]either precedent nor common sense 
requires such a result.”22 
Similarly, many states have enacted a testimonial privilege for 
communications by sexual-assault victims (whether children or 
adults) to counselors who attempt to help the victims,23 and for 
 
20 Id. at 60–61 (footnote omitted). 
21 Id. at 61. 
22 Id. 
23 For a listing of such provisions, see IMWINKELREID, supra note 10, at app. d.  
At least one federal court has also recognized such a privilege.  See United States v. 
Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996).  Because the complainant in that case 
waived the privilege, the court was not called upon to determine whether the 
privilege was qualified or absolute.  Id. at 100.  In Commonwealth v. Wilson, 602 
A.2d 1290 (Pa. 1992), Pennsylvania’s highest court explained why such 
communications should be privileged: 
Extensive research has been conducted documenting the severe 
psychological, emotional, and social difficulties suffered by rape victims, 
which cause a condition known as “rape trauma syndrome.”  The 
devastating effects of this condition create a compelling need for a 
confidential counseling relationship to enable the victim to cope with the 
trauma.  It is generally recognized that rape traumatizes its victim to a 
degree far beyond that experienced by victims of other crimes.  Rape crisis 
centers have been developed nationwide to help victims of this most 
degrading offense recover from its debilitating effects. 
 Rape crisis centers are service facilities staffed with counselors 
extensively trained in crisis counseling.  These counselors provide victims 
with much needed physical, psychological and social support during the 
recovery period that the victims otherwise might not be able to afford.  At 
the onset of counseling the victim is informed that her communications will 
be confidential, and her willingness to disclose information quite obviously 
is based upon that expectation.  The very nature of the relationship 
between a counselor and the victim of such a crime exposes the necessity 
for the same confidentiality that would exist if private psychotherapeutic 
treatment were obtained.  If that confidentiality is removed, that trust is 
severely undermined, and the maximum therapeutic benefit is lost.  The 
inability of the crisis center to achieve its goals is detrimental not only to 
the victim but also to society, whose interest in the report and prosecution 
of sexual assault crimes is furthered by the emotional and physical well-
being of the victim. 
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communications between domestic violence victims and 
counselors (sometimes called “advocates”) who specialize in 
assisting such victims.24  A number of jurisdictions also have 
enacted privileges protecting statements made by patients or 
clients in substance abuse counseling.25 
 
Id. at 1295 (quoted approvingly in State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 415 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1996)). 
 Thus, recognition of the privilege will encourage rape victims to seek professional 
help in dealing with what they have suffered, and will encourage victims to report 
the crime and cooperate in the prosecution of the perpetrators.  See generally 
Jennifer L. Hebert, Note, Mental Health Records in Sexual Assault Cases:  Striking a 
Balance to Ensure a Fair Trial for Victims and Defendants, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1453 
(2005) (discussing the necessary balance between the defendant’s constitutional 
rights and the privacy rights of the victim); Maureen B. Hogan, Note, The 
Constitutionality of an Absolute Privilege for Rape Crisis Counseling:  A Criminal 
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Rights Versus a Rape Victim’s Right to Confidential 
Therapeutic Counseling, 30 B.C. L. REV. 411 (1989).  Similarly, see Commonwealth 
v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 852 (Mass. 1996), abrogated by Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 
859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006), one of a series of cases in which Massachusetts 
established an elaborate procedure for protecting such records and 
communications.  In Commmonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006), 
Massachusetts’s Supreme Court significantly reduced such protections in favor of 
defense counsel’s right to access such records.  See infra Part V.A.1. 
24 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-90-107(k)(I) (West 2006); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 90.5036(1)(d) (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 455.220(1)(5) (West 2003); 23 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6116 (West 2001).  In general, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
REPORT TO CONGRESS:  THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN 
SEXUAL ASSAULT OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS AND THEIR COUNSELORS:  
FINDINGS AND MODEL LEGISLATION (1995), which in an appendix, lists and 
categorizes state provisions.  Id. at app. 2.  For a detailed discussion of the rationale 
underlying the creation of the privilege, see People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639, 642–44 
(Colo. 2005). 
25 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2006) (entitled “Confidentiality of records”).  
Section (a) establishes a general rule of confidentiality, subject to exceptions.           
§ 290dd-2(a).  Section (b)(2)(C) authorizes disclosure of the records: 
If authorized by an appropriate order of a court of competent jurisdiction 
granted after application showing good cause therefor, including the need 
to avert a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm.  In assessing 
good cause the court shall weigh the public interest and the need for 
disclosure against the injury to the patient, to the physician-patient 
relationship, and to the treatment services. 
§ 290dd-2(b)(2)(C).  The court must specify what may be disclosed and establish 
“appropriate safeguards against unauthorized disclosure.”  Id. 
 Some states include communications to substance abuse counselors in general 
privilege or confidentiality statutes.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-3005(A) 
(2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.4 (1996).  Other states have enacted legislation 
creating a privilege for communications to such counselors.  See, e.g., LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 37:3390.4 (2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:2D-11 (West 2004); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 44-53-140 (2002).  Information in this note is adapted from Phyllis Coleman, 
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III 
IDENTIFYING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AT ISSUE 
In assessing whether a defendant should have access to 
otherwise-privileged communications, four provisions of the 
United States Constitution must be considered:  the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth26 and Fourteenth Amendments,27 and the 
Confrontation Clause and Compulsory Process Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment.28 
A.  Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
A defense attorney will seek access to a prosecution witness’s 
therapy or counseling records in the hope of finding information 
with which to cross-examine and impeach the witness.  The right 
to do this is guaranteed to the defendant by the Confrontation 
Clause. 
Davis v. Alaska29 is the Supreme Court’s leading decision on 
the scope of cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause, 
and therefore merits discussion here, even though it does not 
involve a witness’s psychiatric or counseling records.  Davis was 
charged in connection with a safe that had been stolen from a 
bar.30  Green, a sixteen-year-old, testified that (a few hours after 
the safe was stolen) he saw and spoke to Davis in the immediate 
vicinity of where the stolen safe was subsequently found.31  At 
 
Privilege and Confidentiality in 12-Step Self-Help Programs:  Believing the Promises 
Could Be Hazardous to an Addict’s Freedom, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 435, 463 (2005). 
26 The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:  “No person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. V. 
27 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:  “No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
28 The Sixth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:  “In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”  U.S. CONST. amend. 
VI. 
29 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
30 Id. at 309. 
31 Id. at 310.  Green initially identified Davis in a photo lineup.  Id.  He also 
described Davis’s car.  Id.  When police searched Davis’s rental car, which matched 
Green’s description, they found paint chips in the trunk matching the paint on the 
safe.  Id. 
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the time, Green was on probation from a juvenile-court 
adjudication for delinquency for burglarizing two cabins and was 
still on probation during Davis’s trial.32  Davis’s attorney sought 
to cross-examine Green about whether Green might have hastily 
identified the defendant when the police first interviewed him 
for fear of jeopardizing his probation or of being accused 
himself.33  The trial court, relying on an Alaska statute protecting 
the confidentiality of juvenile-court adjudications, refused to 
allow any reference to Green’s adjudication or probation.34 
The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Burger, reversed 
Davis’s conviction.35  The Sixth Amendment right to confront 
one’s accuser, the Court emphasized, included the right to cross-
examine the prosecution’s witness in an attempt to prove his 
prejudice or bias.36  Although defense counsel had been 
permitted at trial to ask Green whether he feared that the police 
might suspect him, counsel had not been permitted to bring out 
the underlying reason why Green might feel that way.37  This, 
the Court held, prevented the defense from exposing the jury to 
information it needed to make a properly informed decision 
regarding the credibility of the witness’s testimony.38  While 
acknowledging the State’s legitimate interest in protecting the 
anonymity of juvenile offenders, the Court held this interest 
“cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the 
effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness.”39 
The analogy between Davis and the subject of this Article is 
clear enough:  in Davis, a statute, enacted to reflect a legitimate 
public policy to prevent disclosure of embarrassing information 
(which in a sense categorized the information as privileged), had 
 
32 Id. at 310–11. 
33 Id. at 311. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 320–21. 
36 Id. at 315.  Chief Justice Burger wrote that “[c]onfrontation means more than 
being allowed to confront the witness physically.  ‘Our cases construing the 
[confrontation] clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-
examination.’”  Id. (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965) 
(alteration in original)). 
37 Id. at 318. 
38 Id. at 317. 
39 Id. at 320.  Justices White and Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the trial 
court’s decision was a typical and proper exercise of discretion over cross-
examination.  Id. at 321 (White, J., dissenting). 
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to give way to permit a defendant to accuse a state witness of 
bias and motive to lie, even though there was no direct evidence 
that the witness had lied40 or that the information in fact 
motivated him to do so.  If a defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
rights are strong enough to trump Alaska’s juvenile-adjudication 
“privilege” where the information supported at best a 
speculative argument of bias, does it not follow that a 
defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights also are strong enough 
to trump state statutory or common law privileges protecting a 
witness’s mental-health or rape counseling records, when 
information in those records might support a defense argument 
that the witness is delusional or lying? 
This analogy may be clear, but is not necessarily apt, for at 
least two reasons.  First, Davis involved a defendant’s rights at 
trial to disclose information already in the defendant’s 
possession.  By contrast, most of the litigation discussed in this 
Article involves whether a defendant is entitled to obtain pretrial 
or midtrial discovery of information about which, often, defense 
counsel lacks specific knowledge.  Second, society’s interest in 
protecting the confidentiality of communications between a 
patient and a mental-health practitioner,41 or between a child 
abuse victim and a counselor,42 or between a rape victim and a 
counselor,43 or between a domestic-abuse victim and a 
counselor,44 is far more substantial than its interest in keeping a 
juvenile’s adjudications secret. 
But if the analogy did hold, then it would be difficult to justify 
constraints on a defendant’s access to a complainant’s counseling 
records.45 
 
40 Indeed, circumstantial evidence strongly corroborated Green’s testimony.  See 
supra note 31. 
41 See generally 5 CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, JONES ON 
EVIDENCE § 47:1–2 (7th ed. 1992 & Supp. 2006). 
42 See id. § 47:4B. 
43 See id. § 47:5. 
44 See id. § 47:6. 
45 Another analogy also may be worth considering.  Courts recognize that in sex-
offense prosecutions, evidence of the complainant’s prior sexual behavior that 
otherwise would be excluded by rape-shield legislation nevertheless should be 
admitted where such evidence is relevant to suggest that the complainant falsely 
accused the defendant to deny infidelity, see 3 FISHMAN &  MCKENNA, supra note 
41, § 19:35, deflect a prosecution for prostitution, see id. § 19:36, or protect a 
reputation for chastity or heterosexuality, see id. § 19:37.  In addition, courts 
recognize that such evidence should be admitted where complainant falsely accused 
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B.  Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,46 a defendant accused of sexually 
abusing his teenage daughter sought to discover the records of 
the state Children and Youth Services (CYS) agency relating to 
the child, arguing that he was entitled to the information because 
the file might contain the names of favorable witnesses and 
other, unspecified exculpatory evidence.47  The statute creating 
the agency directed that its records were generally privileged but 
provided that the agency must disclose the information when 
directed to do so by court order.48  The trial judge refused to 
order disclosure of the records to the defendant and, further, 
refused to examine the records in camera to determine what, if 
anything, should be disclosed to defendant.49  Defendant was 
convicted, and appealed.  The state supreme court held that by 
denying access to the CYS file, the trial court order had violated 
both the Confrontation and the Compulsory Process Clauses of 
the Sixth Amendment, because, without the CYS material, 
defense counsel could not effectively question the defendant’s 
daughter and best expose the weaknesses in her testimony.50  It 
remanded for a hearing to determine if a new trial was 
necessary, and directed that, at the hearing, defense counsel was 
entitled to review the entire file for any useful evidence.51  The 
State appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court agreed that further proceedings were 
necessary to determine if the defendant’s rights had been 
violated, but did not produce a clear majority as to the right in 
question.52  One reason it could not do so is that two Justices, 
Stevens and Scalia, refused to consider the merits of the case, 
insisting that the Court should not have heard the case at all; 
they argued the ruling below was not a final judgment, and 
therefore the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the 
 
defendant out of vengeance or spite, see id. § 19:38–39, or in the aftermath of an 
episode involving sex and drugs, see id. § 19:40. 
46 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
47 Id. at 44. 
48 Id. at 43–44. 
49 See id. at 44. 
50 See id. at 46. 
51 See id. 
52 Id. at 61. 
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matter.53  (It is perhaps worth noting that Justices Stevens and 
Scalia are the only Justices who are still on the Court.)  The 
seven Justices who considered the merits divided widely on the 
theories and issues presented. 
1.  Confrontation Clause 
Justice Powell’s plurality opinion (in which Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices White and O’Connor joined) rejected the 
theory that the Confrontation Clause was a constitutionally 
compelled rule of pretrial discovery.54  The pluralty insisted the 
right to confront one’s accusers, guaranteed by the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments is a trial right, guaranteeing an 
opportunity for effective cross-examination–not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way and to whatever 
extent the defense might wish.55 
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the plurality’s assertion in 
Ritchie that the Confrontation Clause had no impact on pretrial 
discovery, but concurred in the result because he agreed that an 
in camera examination of the records would suffice to assure 
compliance with the Confrontation Clause.56  Justice Brennan, 
writing also for Justice Marshall, dissented, insisting that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had correctly concluded that the 
case implicated the Confrontation Clause, and that the only 
appropriate remedy was disclosure of the records to defense 
counsel.  Justice Brennan reasoned that only counsel, not a 
judge, had sufficient knowledge of the facts and the theory of the 
defense to adequately evaluate the material in the records.57 
Thus, three Justices argued that the Confrontation Clause 
does apply to the situation; four concluded that it does not. 
2.  Due Process 
The plurality concluded that the trial judge’s refusal to 
conduct an in camera examination of the records constituted a 
 
53 Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in the 
dissent but also dissented on the merits from the plurality opinion.  Id. at 66 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 52. 
55 See id. at 51–55. 
56 Id. at 61–66 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
57 Id. at 66–72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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denial of defendant’s due process right to exculpatory evidence 
in possession of the state.58  Consistent with its decisions 
applying that due process right,59 the plurality rejected the 
proposition that the defense should have access to the 
documents to make its own determination of relevance: 
 To allow full disclosure to defense counsel in this type of 
case would sacrifice unnecessarily the Commonwealth’s 
compelling interest in protecting [privileged] information.         
. . . Neither precedent nor common sense requires such a 
result. . . . An in camera review by the trial court will serve 
Ritchie’s interest without destroying the Commonwealth’s 
need to protect the [privileged information].
60
 
The plurality expressed confidence that an in camera review 
could adequately protect the defendant’s rights.  It emphasized: 
“[T]he trial court’s discretion is not unbounded.  If a defendant 
is aware of specific information contained in the file (e.g., the 
medical report), he is free to request it directly from the court, 
and argue in favor of its materiality.”61 
Moreover, the plurality stressed, the trial judge’s in camera 
inspection was not a one-time-only proposition; rather, “the duty 
to disclose is ongoing; information that may be deemed 
immaterial upon original examination may become important as 
the proceedings progress, and the court would be obligated to 
release information material to the fairness of the trial.”62 
The Court therefore remanded the case for an in camera 
examination of the records by the trial court to determine 
whether the files contained information that was “material” to 
the defense of the accused.63  The Court explicitly “express[ed] 
no opinion on whether the result in this case would have been 
different if the statute had protected the CYS files from 
 
58 Id. at 58 (plurality opinion).  See infra Part IV.B (discussing application of 
Ritchie to records and communications in the possession of private entities). 
59 See infra note 70 (brief summary of these cases). 
60 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60–61. 
61 Id. at 60. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 58; see infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the Court’s definition of 
“materiality”).  For reasons described later, this Article proposes a standard 
different from the materiality standard adopted in Ritchie.  See infra Part V.C.1. 
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disclosure to anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial 
personnel [i.e., if the privilege had been absolute].”64 
3.  Compulsory Process Clause 
The Court declined to discuss whether the case implicated 
Ritchie’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory 
Process Clause.65  The plurality acknowledged that the 
Compulsory Process Clause might, by implication, involve 
discovery, but concluded that there was no need to address the 
issue:  “Because the applicability of the Sixth Amendment to this 
type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth 
Amendment precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of 
trials establish a clear framework for review, we adopt a due 
process analysis for purposes of this case.”66  Significantly, the 
plurality elaborated: 
Although we conclude that compulsory process provides no 
greater protections in this area than those afforded by due 
process, we need not decide today whether and how the 
guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  It is enough to conclude that 
on these facts, Ritchie’s claims more properly are considered 
by reference to due process.
67
 
This language suggests the possibility that the Compulsory 
Process Clause might provide fewer “protections in this area 
than those afforded by due process,” a possibility that may be 
quite significant in cases where the records are not generated or 
possessed by a state agency, in which case the due process 
precedents that the Court relied on would not apply.68 
4.  “Materiality” 
In remanding for an in camera examination by the trial court 
to determine whether the files contained information that was 
material to the defense, the Court defined “material” as follows:  
“Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 
 
64 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 n.14; see infra Part IV.A (discussing case law regarding 
the application of Ritchie to an absolute privilege). 
65 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 See infra Part IV.B (discussing defense access to such records). 
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that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”69  It derived this definition from its prior decisions 
regarding a prosecutor’s obligation to disclose exculpatory 
evidence that was already in the possession of the government.70 
This is obviously a more restrictive test than that articulated in 
Davis v. Alaska,71 which held that, despite a state statute akin to 
a privilege that bans the use of such evidence, the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause entitles a defendant to 
introduce evidence at trial, so long as that evidence supports a 
defense argument that a state witness has a motive to lie or shade 
his or her testimony.72  It may appear from this discussion that a 
defendant may have a greater right to introduce certain types of 
evidence than he or she has to discover such evidence.  But this 
is not perhaps as strange as it may seem at first glance, because 
the privileges under discussion in this Article generally are 
regarded as far more important, and therefore as deserving 
much-greater protection, than the state policy at stake in Davis. 
5.  Summary 
Thus, Ritchie resolved only two issues: 
(1) The four-Justice plurality concluded that well-established 
due process principles, requiring the State to disclose any 
exculpatory material it possessed, applied to otherwise-
privileged information in a witness’s mental-health records 
maintained by a state agency, at least when the privilege is 
qualified rather than absolute.  Presumably the three Justices 
who argued that the Confrontation Clause should apply would 
have voted for the plurality’s due process in camera procedure if 
 
69 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 
(1985)). 
70 See id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)) (defining 
“materiality” in assessing whether a failure to disclose information provides a basis 
to set aside a conviction); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that 
the prosecutor’s fulfillment of its obligations under Brady is measured in part by the 
degree of specificity with which the defendant seeks disclosure of exculpatory 
information); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (enunciating the 
prosecutor’s obligation to make timely disclosure to the defense of all exculpatory 
evidence). 
71 415 U.S. 308 (1974); see also supra Part III.A. 
72 See supra text accompanying note 39. 
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the alternative had been no disclosure or review at all.  Thus, 
where the records are possessed by a state agency and they are 
protected by a qualified and not an absolute privilege, a 
defendant’s right to due process disclosure via in camera review 
appears to be firmly established. 
(2) A majority held that at the postconviction stage, it suffices 
that the trial court conduct an in camera review of the state 
witness’s mental health records; direct disclosure to defense 
counsel is not required.73 
Ritchie therefore did not resolve any of the issues listed above.  
Nearly two decades later, few if any of these issues have been 
resolved. 
IV 
“ABSOLUTE” PRIVILEGES; PRIVATE AGENCIES AND RECORDS 
The privilege at issue in Ritchie was a qualified privilege, i.e., 
on its terms it recognized that a court had the authority to order 
disclosure of the records in question.  The Court pointedly 
“express[ed] no opinion” as to the outcome “if the statute had 
protected the [government agency’s] files from disclosure to 
anyone, including law-enforcement and judicial personnel.”74  
Moreover, because the records in question were maintained by 
and in the possession of a state agency, the plurality based its 
decision on the State’s due process obligation to provide the 
defense with exculpatory information in its possession.75  Thus, 
Ritchie provides no guidance as to private records. 
We now examine how lower courts have attempted to apply 
Ritchie in such situations. 
A.  “Absolute” Privilege 
Lower federal and state courts have had to resolve the conflict 
between a defendant’s right to obtain exculpatory information 
 
73 This majority consisted of the four-Justice plurality, and Justice Blackmun, 
who concurred in the result.  The plurality concluded that only Ritchie’s right to 
due process was at stake; Justice Blackmun concluded that the situation implicated 
Ritchie’s Confrontation Clause right, but that an in camera review, rather than full 
disclosure of the records to the defendant, sufficed to protect his Confrontation 
Clause right.  Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39, 61. 
74 Id. at 57 n.14; see also infra Part IV.A. 
75 See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56–60; see also infra Part IV.B. 
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and a statutory privilege that on its face is absolute.  Four 
different approaches have emerged. 
1.  If Witness Asserts “Absolute” Privilege, Her Testimony Is 
Stricken 
Where a defendant has established a constitutional right to 
the disclosure of privileged information, but the statutory 
privilege is absolute on its face, some courts have held that the 
witness retains the privilege:  a court cannot disclose unless the 
witness waives the privilege.  Absent such a waiver, if the 
defendant adequately demonstrates the need for an in camera 
review or disclosure of the records,76 the witness is precluded 
from testifying.  If he or she has already testified, his or her 
testimony is stricken from the record. 
States following this approach include Connecticut,77 
Michigan,78 Nebraska,79 New Mexico,80 Wisconsin,81 and South 
Dakota.82 
 
76 See infra Parts V.B–C (discussing current law and providing recommendations 
for a proposed standard for obtaining in camera review and, in appropriate 
circumstances, disclosure of records). 
77 State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting State v. Slimskey, 779 
A.2d 723, 730–31 (Conn. 2001)); State v. Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117, 1124 (Conn. 1996); 
State v. Whitaker, 520 A.2d 1018, 1025 (Conn. 1987); State v. Esposito, 471 A.2d 
949, 956 (Conn. 1984).  Connecticut’s procedure is particularly elaborate.  A 
defendant may subpoena witnesses to testify at a closed-courtroom hearing to 
attempt to make the required showing.  See Peeler, 857 A.2d at 841.  If defendant 
succeeds, and the witness refuses to waive the privilege, the witness’s testimony is 
banned (or stricken).  Id.  The witness may waive the privilege for the limited 
purpose of permitting the court to make an in camera inspection of the records.  See 
id.  If the court concludes that information in the records must be disclosed to 
protect the defendant’s confrontation rights under the state constitution, the witness 
again has the option of permitting disclosure by waiving the privilege as to those 
entries in the records that the trial judge believes must be disclosed, or of asserting 
the privilege, in which case he or she cannot testify (or the testimony must be 
stricken).  See id. at 841–42. 
78 Michigan’s statutes expressly provided that confidential communications made 
to a sexual- or domestic-assault counselor “shall not be admissible as evidence in 
any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim.”  
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2157a(2) (West 2000); see also People v. Stanaway, 
521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994). 
79 State v. Trammell, 435 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Neb. 1989) (physical assault and rape 
of a forty-year-old woman; adopting the Connecticut procedure established in 
Esposito, 471 A.2d 949); see also State v. Kinser, 609 N.W.2d 322, 325–26 (Neb. 
2000). 
80 See State v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, ¶¶ 16–17, 121 N.M. 421, 912 P.2d 297.  
The court upheld dismissal of rape charges because the complainant, acting at the 
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2.  No In Camera Review, No Disclosure; Witness May Testify 
At least a few state courts have held that, where a privilege is 
absolute, the defendant simply has no right to access the records, 
nor to trigger an in camera review, because even an in camera 
review would intrude upon the confidentiality of the records.83 
 
prosecutor’s direction, refused to sign a waiver authorizing submission of the 
records to the court, even though earlier she had signed a waiver releasing those 
records to the police and prosecutor–although the prosecutor insisted that no one 
in that office ever received or looked at the records.  Id. 
81 See State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719, 724–25 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), modified on 
other grounds, State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298.  
In Shiffra, the court upheld a pretrial order suppressing the sexual-assault 
complainant’s testimony after the trial court found that the defendant had made a 
satisfactory preliminary finding of materiality and complainant refused to waive the 
privilege to permit an in camera inspection.  Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d at 724–25. 
82 See State v. Karlen, 589 N.W.2d 594, 601 (S.D. 1999). 
83 Colorado’s Supreme Court has addressed the issue twice.  People v. District 
Court of Denver, 719 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1986) (decided prior to Ritchie), involved a 
defendant’s attempt to obtain the records of a sexual-assault complainant’s 
postassault psychological counseling.  See id.  In People v. Turner, 109 P.3d 639 
(Colo. 2005), the defendant in a domestic-abuse case sought records of the 
complainant’s counseling with a domestic-violence victim advocate center.  Id.  In 
both decisions the court held that the privilege was absolute and that the witness 
could testify.  See id. at 647; Dist. Ct. of Denver, 719 P.2d at 727.  Turner relied 
heavily on the fact that the privilege at issue was absolute, in contrast to the one at 
issue in Ritchie.  In both Turner and District Court of Denver, the court stressed that 
the defendant did not make any specific factual showing that the records likely 
would contain significant impeachment material; rather, each defendant merely 
alleged that the records might reveal statements inconsistent with the witness’s 
likely trial testimony.  Thus, although the court in each case rejected a balancing 
test, it has not yet faced a case where a defendant makes a specific factual showing 
that denial of at least an in camera review would undermine his rights to 
confrontation, compulsory process, or a fair trial. 
 An intermediate appellate court in Illinois has adopted a similar approach.  See 
People v. Harlacher, 634 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (discussing Family 
Advocate records). 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court read Ritchie as permitting a state to create an 
absolute privilege without negative repercussions.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 
602 A.2d 1290, 1297–98 (Pa. 1992).  The court held that where the statutory 
privilege is absolute in its terms, the defendant is not entitled to any form of 
discovery or in camera review; nor, apparently, is the complainant’s testimony 
subject to exclusion.  See id.  Neither defendant in the two unrelated cases joined 
for appeal in Wilson made any specific showing, each merely claiming a right to 
access to the records to see if they contained any impeaching material; but the 
opinion in its terms does not rely on the inadequacy of the defendants’ showing to 
justify an absolute ban on access or in camera review.  See id. at 1294–98.  Although 
the case involves records of (and testimony by) rape counselors, dictum in the 
decision applies to statements protected by an equally broad and unequivocal 
psychotherapist-patient privilege.  See id. at 1295.  But see Commonwealth v. Davis, 
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Two federal court decisions also appear to lean in this 
direction.84  One federal district court judge likened the situation 
to one where: 
[A] co-defendant in a criminal case [makes] a deal with the 
Government and testif[ies] against the remaining defendants.  
The co-defendant is himself represented by counsel.  Can 
anyone imagine the court granting a motion by the defendants 
to examine the cooperating defendant’s attorney in camera 
regarding the privileged statements made to him to determine 
if any could be helpful to the defense?
85
 
Indeed, few lawyers could imagine a court granting such a 
motion. 
But this does not compel giving equal weight to the privileges 
discussed in this Article.  The law values the attorney-client 
privilege so highly because our entire adversarial system of 
criminal justice depends on the sanctity of that privilege; breach 
it, and there is a substantial risk that the entire system will crash, 
 
674 A.2d 214 (Pa. 1996) (holding that where the complainant consents to allow the 
Commonwealth access to records of her sexual-assault counseling, the defendant 
must receive equal access); Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 642 A.2d 1132, 1135–36 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1994) (holding that where the State improperly called and elicited 
testimony from the complainant’s counselor without the complainant’s permission, 
it was reversible error to deny the defendant equal access). 
84 See United States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1189–91 (D. Ore. 1998) (holding 
that a defendant has no right to an in camera review of the mental-health records of 
a victim when the government sought an upward departure at a sentencing hearing 
for the victim’s extreme psychological injury); see also Newton v. Kemna, 354 F.3d 
776, 785 (8th Cir. 2004) (no abuse of discretion in a habeas proceeding when the 
trial court denied discovery and in camera review of psychiatric records). 
 Newton held that a petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief from a state 
conviction because Ritchie did not clearly establish a Confrontation Clause right to 
access to a witness’s records:  “[W]e may grant relief only if the state court has 
decided a matter contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent or has 
unreasonably applied that precedent.”  Id. at 781 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) 
(2000)) (sets the standard for habeas relief from a state conviction).  The court 
concluded that the Supreme Court, in Ritchie, had not “clearly established” the 
defendant’s right to relief.  See id. at 784–85.  First, Newton’s habeas petition was 
founded on the Confrontation Clause, but of the seven Justices who considered the 
issue in Ritchie, four rejected a claim that the clause afforded discovery to a 
defendant.  Id.  Second, the privilege at issue in Ritchie was a qualified privilege for 
rape-counseling records, not, as in Newton, an absolute privilege for psychiatric 
records.  See id. 
85 Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1191. 
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or at least will produce verdicts of guilt far less reliable than we 
now take for granted.86 
3.  The Ritchie Approach Prevails Even if the Privilege Is 
“Absolute” 
By contrast, a number of courts have held that a trial judge 
can, and in appropriate cases must, conduct an in camera 
inspection of the records, despite the apparently absolute nature 
of a privilege.87  These courts conclude that the defendant’s 
 
86 I concede that a critic might plausibly argue that this is no more than a 
“profession-centric” way of saying:  “The legal profession makes this distinction 
between the attorney-client and all other privileges because we have the power to 
do so.” 
87 United States v. Mazzola, 217 F.R.D. 84, 88 (D. Mass. 2003).  The judge further 
concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty provided, 
at best, only “qualified,” not absolute privacy protection, and that the defendants’ 
legitimate need for the information outweighed the witness’s privacy interest.  Id. 
 In United States v. Alperin, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1251 (N.D. Cal. 2001), the court 
concluded, in a prosecution for assaulting a federal agent, that the defendant was 
entitled to in camera review of the complainant’s mental health records.  Id. at 1255.  
Curiously, the court commented that “[n]o circuit court has addressed this issue 
following [Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996), in which the Supreme Court 
recognized a federal patient-psychotherapist privilege].”  Id. at 1253.  The U.S. 
Magistrate Judge made no mention of United States v. Hatch, 162 F.3d 937, 947 (7th 
Cir. 1998). 
 In United States v. Hansen, 955 F. Supp. 1225 (D. Mont. 1997), a district court 
held that a murder defendant was entitled to disclosure of the deceased’s 
psychiatric-treatment records, because “[t]he mental and emotional condition of the 
deceased is a central element” of defendant’s self-defense claim.  Id. at 1226.  The 
court reasoned: 
The holder of the privilege has little private interest in preventing 
disclosure, because he is dead.  The public does have an interest in 
preventing disclosure, since persons in need of therapy may be less likely to 
seek help if they fear their most personal thoughts will be revealed, even 
after their death.  However, I find that the defendant’s need for the 
privileged material outweighs this interest. 
Id. (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10–11).  The year after Hansen was decided, however, 
the Supreme Court, in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), held 
that the attorney-client privilege survives the death of the client.  Id. at 410–11.  The 
Court reasoned that clients frequently tell their attorneys highly personal 
information that attorneys need to help the clients structure their legal affairs, 
including information that the clients would not want divulged even after their 
death.  See id. at 407–08.  For a fuller discussion of Swidler, see 5 FISHMAN & 
MCKENNA, supra note 41, § 45:5.  Presumably this is at least as likely with regard to 
statements made to a psychotherapist or other counselor. 
 Several states and a federal court in Massachusetts have leaned toward this 
approach as well.  See United States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97 (D. Mass. 1996) 
(employing the in camera procedure where the complainant agreed to a limited 
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constitutional rights must prevail over the privilege.88  Two pre-
Jaffe federal circuit court opinions also support allowing in 




waiver of the privilege for that purpose); People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 993 
(Cal. 1997); Lucas v. State, 555 S.E.2d 440, 446 (Ga. 2001) (no error to deny 
disclosure of codefendant’s psychiatric- and psychological-counseling records); 
Herendeen v. State, 601 S.E.2d 372, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (Herendeen was a 
psychologist whose records were subpoenaed, not a defendant); State v. Peseti, 65 
P.3d 119, 133–34 (Haw. 2003); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Ky. 
2003); State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 71 (Minn. 1992) (“‘[T]he medical privilege, 
like other privileges, sometimes must give way to the defendant’s right to confront 
his accusers.’” (quoting State v. Kutchara, 350 N.W.2d 924, 926 (Minn. 1984)); 
Missouri ex rel. White v. Gray, 141 S.W.3d 460, 466–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. 
Duffy, 2000 MT 186 ¶¶ 23–24, 300 Mont. 381, 388, ¶¶ 23–24, 6 P.3d 453, 459; State 
v. Donnelly, 798 P.2d 89, 92 (Mont. 1990), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Imlay, 813 P.2d 979 (Mont. 1991); State v. J.G., 619 A.2d 232, 237 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1993) (“We hold that in the absence of compelling circumstances, 
communications between a crime victim and a counselor consulted for treatment 
are absolutely immune from disclosure.”); People v. Bridgeland, 796 N.Y.S.2d 768, 
771–72 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 
469 A.2d 1161, 1166 (R.I. 1983) (creation of an absolute evidentiary privilege would 
violate the defendant’s constitutional rights to confrontation and compulsory 
process); State v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, ¶¶ 20–21, 121 NM 421, 426–27, 912 
P.2d 297 (upholding dismissal of rape charges because the complainant, acting at 
the prosecutor’s direction, refused to sign a waiver authorizing submission of the 
records to the court, even though earlier she had signed a waiver releasing those 
records to the police and prosecutor; the prosecutor insisted that no one in that 
office ever received or looked at the records.). 
88 See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
89 In Doe v. Diamond, 964 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1992), the Second Circuit upheld a 
trial court’s order holding a government witness (the complainant in an extortion 
case) in contempt for refusing to answer questions about his psychiatric history 
during a pretrial in camera hearing.  Id. at 1326.  The court reasoned that in view of 
the witness’s importance and the effect of his psychiatric history on his credibility, 
preclusion of the inquiry because of the privilege would violate the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id. at 1328–29.  “[T]he balance in this case weighs overwhelmingly in favor 
of allowing an inquiry into his history of mental illness.”  Id. at 1329. 
 In United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154 (11th Cir. 1983), a decision that 
preceded both Jaffe and Ritchie, the Eleventh Circuit held that the trial court erred 
in denying the defendants access to a key government witness’s records, which 
apparently revealed that the witness suffered from, and had been treated and 
confined for, paranoia.  Id. at 1156–57.  Because paranoia often skews a person’s 
perception of reality and may trigger an obsession to avenge imagined wrongs, the 
court reasoned, the trial court had denied the defendants the right to adequately 
confront and cross-examine this witness.  Id. at 1160–63. 
 Neither Doe nor Lindstrom is in direct and flagrant contradiction of Jaffee or 
Ritchie, but their continued validity is open to some question. 
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4.  Defense Counsel May Inspect Records Under Strict Conditions 
Regarding Disclosure 
In Commonwealth v. Dwyer,90 Massachusetts’s highest court 
held that, upon an adequate showing of need, the trial court 
must permit defense counsel to examine the materials under 
carefully controlled conditions and circumstances, but that 
counsel may not disclose or use the information he or she learns 
unless explicitly authorized to do so by the trial judge.91 
5.  Courts Divided, or No Explicit Ruling 
In some states, such as Florida, intermediate appellate courts 
are divided on the issue.92  In other states, such as Illinois, the 
law is too unclear to categorize.93 
 
90 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006). 
91 See id. at 418–19; see also infra Part V.A.1. 
92 State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).  The court held that a 
defendant could obtain in camera review of a privilege that was absolute on its face.  
Id. at 417.  Two other Florida state courts have held that because the privilege is 
absolute, the defendant has no right even to an in camera inspection of a state 
witness’s mental-health records.  State v. Roberson, 884 So. 2d 976, 980 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2004); State v. Famiglietti, 817 So. 2d 901, 906–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002). 
93 Illinois’s Supreme Court has sent mixed signals.  In People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d 
1031 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983), aff’d, 470 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. 1984), an intermediate appellate 
court held that, even though a statutory psychotherapist-patient privilege was 
absolute on its face, the trial judge properly conducted an in camera inspection of 
the mental-health records of the state’s key witness in a burglary trial, and further 
held that the trial judge had erred in refusing to disclose certain material to the 
defense.  See id. at 1035.  On appeal, the state supreme court commented:  “The 
question is discussed in detail in the opinion of the appellate court and we need not 
repeat the discussion here.  It suffices to say that we agree with the appellate court 
that, under the circumstances shown by the evidence, the refusal to permit the 
discovery was reversible error.”  People v. Dace, 470 N.E.2d 993, 996 (Ill. 1984) 
(citations omitted). 
 In People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. 1988), the court concluded that a 
defendant’s request for an in camera inspection of the rape complainant’s 
counseling records, which merely asked the judge to review records of her 
statements relating to the instant incident to determine whether they contained 
information useful for impeachment, with no specific allegations supporting a claim 
that such material was likely to be found, was insufficient to trigger an in camera 
review.  Id. at 91–92.  The court did not explicitly rule on the appropriate procedure 
if defendant had made an adequate showing and the complainant refused to waive 
the privilege, but at least one intermediate appellate court has apparently read 
Foggy as holding that the sex-abuse-counseling privilege is absolute.  See People v. 
Harlacher, 634 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).  But since the defendant in 
Foggy did not make any specific showing as to why those records should be 
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6.  Evaluation 
Of the four approaches outlined above, the second, denying 
all review, is the least satisfying.  As Kentucky’s Supreme Court 
expressed: 
 The issue . . . is not whether [a defendant’s] “need” for the 
evidence should be balanced against [a witness’s] interest in 
maintaining the confidentiality of her psychotherapy, but 
whether the constitutional rights afforded to a criminal 
defendant by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to 
[the] United States Constitution [and corresponding provisions 
in the state constitution] prevail over a state policy interest 
expressed in a statute or rule creating an evidentiary privilege.  
As a general proposition, constitutional rights prevail over 
conflicting statutes and rules.
94
 
There is a serious problem with the first approach:  precluding 
the prosecutor from calling the witness at all, unless the witness 
waives the privilege, in essence gives the witness the legal 
authority to preclude the prosecution of a dangerous predator.  
A legislature has the authority to enact such a law, but to do so 
constitutes a profoundly unwise social policy.95  Giving the 
witness the right to forbid disclosure, moreover, could often 
produce “unworkable or unwieldy” results, as when a witness-
victim has already testified (an instruction to disregard the 
testimony is unlikely to “unring the bell”), or when the witness is 
a minor, in which case the judge would have to determine who 
has the authority to decide for the minor whether or not to waive 
the privilege.96 
The third and fourth approaches recognize that neither of the 
two conflicting interests, the patient or client’s right to 
 
inspected, there still appears to be no clear state law on how such a situation would 
be handled if in fact a defendant did make a compelling showing for such records. 
94 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 558 (Ky. 2003). 
95 “If . . . the witness is the victim of the crime without whose testimony the 
prosecution could not prove its case, must the case be dismissed if the victim refuses 
to waive the privilege?  If so, what of ‘the fair administration of justice’ and the aim 
‘that guilt shall not escape?’”  Id. at 565 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 708–09 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that although the 
“presumptive privilege for Presidential communications . . . is fundamental to the 
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under 
the Constitution,” sometimes it must yield to a criminal defendant’s rights to 
confront his accusers and to compulsory process to produce evidence in his own 
defense). 
96 Id. 
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nondisclosure and the defendant’s right to a fair trial, should be 
given absolute preference over the other.  Each requires counsel 
to make an adequate showing of need before the possibility of 
disclosure arises.  Each requires the trial judge’s approval before 
defense counsel may use or disclose privileged information.  
They differ in whether (once a showing of need has been made) 
the initial inspection of the records should be performed by the 
judge, or by defense counsel.  The fourth (Massachusetts) 
approach creates too great a risk that the fear of disclosure will 
leave a patient or client unwilling or unable to confide fully in his 
or her counselor and thereby interfere with the therapeutic 
process.97  The third approach, which authorizes the trial judge 
to make the preliminary examination of the records, strikes the 
best balance.  It protects the public’s interest by denying the 
witness the legal authority to veto the prosecution, and 
adequately protects the defendant’s interest in due process.  
Lamentably, it may expose intensely personal and private 
matters, publicly humiliate the witness, and, in sexual-assault 
and child abuse cases, may renew or even magnify the original 
harm done by the defendant’s conduct.  However, allowing the 
State to rely on a witness’s testimony to convict a defendant of a 
crime, yet denying the defendant even an in camera review of 
materials that may significantly undermine that witness’s 
credibility, is a process that is anything but “due”:  it is 
fundamentally unfair and creates too a great a risk that an 
innocent defendant may be convicted. 
B.  Records Held by Private Entities Unaffiliated with the State; 
Compulsory Process Clause 
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie98 dealt with a government agency’s 
records.  If the records were created by and are possessed by a 
private entity, the due process principle on which the Ritchie 
plurality relied presumably would not apply; rather, a defendant 
would have to rely on the Compulsory Process Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment.99  The Ritchie plurality commented in dictum 
that “compulsory process provides no greater protections in this 
 
97 See infra Part V.B.1. 
98 480 U.S. 39, 43 (1987). 
99 Each of the cases Ritchie cited in support of its due process analysis involved 
evidence or information possessed by state agencies.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
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area than those afforded by due process,” but had no cause to 
“decide . . . whether and how the guarantees of the Compulsory 
Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”100 
Courts that have considered the issue are divided.  Some 
courts apparently have held that a defendant has no Fourteenth 
Amendment constitutional right to subpoena a witness’s mental-
health or counseling records in such circumstances.101  Several 
state courts, applying state law, have held that a defendant does 
have the right to attempt to secure an in camera review of 
privately held records.102 
 
100 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 56. 
101 See United States v. Hatch, 162 F.3d 937, 946–47 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the trial court had not erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of a 
government witness’s privately held mental-health records). 
 In United States v. Skorniak, 59 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 1995) the court appears to have 
held that, because the records were not in the government’s hands, defendant could 
not subpoena them.  Id. at 755–56.  The court also notes, however, that the trial 
judge observed that the records did not contain anything of use to the defendant, 
which suggests that the trial court in fact may have conducted an in camera review.  
See id. at 756.  Note that this case was decided prior to Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 
1 (1996), in which the Supreme Court recognized, and categorized as “absolute,” a 
federal patient-psychotherapist privilege.  See id. at 17–18; see also State v. Spath, 
1998 ND 133, ¶ 20, 581 N.W.2d 123, 126–27 (noting the distinction between 
accessing records held by the government and those not held by the government); 
State v. Bassine, 71 P.3d 72, 75–76 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (Federal and Oregon 
Constitutions require discovery of materials that are in possession of the 
government.). 
102 Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866, 874–75 (Md. 1995) (holding that although 
defendant had no constitutional right to pretrial discovery of such records, 
defendant had the right to subpoena the witness’s psychiatrist at trial). 
 Massachusetts’s highest court went even further, applying state rules of criminal 
procedure, and holding that upon an adequate showing of need, defense counsel 
must be permitted to inspect a state witness’s records prior to trial under carefully 
controlled conditions and circumstances.  Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 
400, 414–423 (Mass. 2006). 
 Rhode Island’s Supreme Court, in an advisory opinion rendered prior to Ritchie, 
advised the state legislature that enacting an absolute privilege would violate a 
defendant’s right to confrontation guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions.  
Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (R.I. 1983). 
 In State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993), abrogated by State v. 
Green, 2002 WI App 68, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals upheld a pretrial order suppressing the sexual-assault complainant’s 
testimony after the trial court found that the defendant had made a satisfactory 
preliminary finding of materiality and complainant refused to waive the privilege to 
permit an in camera inspection.  Id. at 724–25.  In State v. Green, 2002 WI App 68, 
253 Wis. 2d 356, 646 N.W.2d 298, the state supreme court implicitly endorsed the 
conclusion that a defendant has a constitutional right to such records upon an 
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Although the United States Supreme Court has never 
squarely ruled on the issue, Kentucky’s Supreme Court, in 
Commonwealth v. Barroso,103 concluded that a careful review of 
United States Supreme Court precedent104 strongly suggests that 
 
adequate showing of need even where the records are not in state possession.  See 
id. ¶ 21 n.4. 
 The California Supreme Court in People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986 (Cal. 1997), 
first observed that the facts of the case provided no occasion “to revisit the question 
of whether a defendant may generally obtain pretrial discovery of unprivileged 
information in the hands of private parties.”  Id. at 993 (emphasis added).  The 
court then added:  “That the defense may issue subpoenas duces tecum to private 
persons is implicit in statutory law and has been clearly recognized by the courts for 
at least two decades.  However, this more general right provides no basis for 
overriding a statutory and constitutional privilege.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
103 122 S.W.3d 554 (Ky. 2003). 
104 The court in Barroso summarized its review thus: 
[T]o date, the United States Supreme Court has held that the denial of the 
right to impeach a prosecution witness violates the Confrontation Clause 
[citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)] but has yet to muster a 
majority on whether the denial of pretrial access to impeachment evidence 
is also a denial of confrontation rights [citing Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 
U.S. 39 (1987)].  It has declared that evidentiary rules [citing Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)] and at least one recognized evidentiary 
privilege [citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957)] must yield to a 
criminal defendant’s due process right to present a defense.  It has also 
stated that a defendant’s due process right to discover exculpatory 
evidence in the possession of the government cannot be defeated by a 
qualified privilege [citing Ritchie], and that the “fair administration of 
justice” requires that privileged inculpatory evidence in the hands of a third 
party be turned over to the prosecution [citing United States v. Nixon, 418 
U.S. 683 (1974)].  It has further held that the right to compulsory process 
includes the right to elicit favorable testimony from defense witnesses 
[citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)], but has yet to specifically 
decide whether that same right prevails over an absolute privilege (though 
Washington provides a close analogy). 
Id. at 561; see supra Part III (discussion of Ritchie and Davis).  In Chambers, the 
Court held that a state’s rule precluding a party from impeaching its own witness 
could not preclude a defendant from offering highly probative evidence of his 
innocence.  See 2 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, § 13:38; 5 id. § 37:20.  
Roviaro held that a defendant has the right to learn the identity of an informer 
where a fair trial requires it.  See id. § 13:18; see also Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61.  In 
Nixon, the Supreme Court held that although the “presumptive privilege for 
Presidential communications . . . is fundamental to the operation of Government 
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution,” 
sometimes it must yield to a criminal defendant’s rights to confront his accusers and 
to compulsory process to produce evidence in his own defense.  See Nixon, 418 U.S. 
at 708.  In Washington, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state statute 
prohibiting accomplices or co-conspirators from testifying on behalf of one another, 
reasoning that a criminal defendant’s right to compulsory process included not only 
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the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment may, in 
an appropriate case, require the third party to provide 
information to the court for in camera inspection.105  According 
to the court:  “If the psychotherapy records of a crucial 
prosecution witness contain evidence probative of the witness’s 
ability to recall, comprehend, and accurately relate the subject 
matter of the testimony, the defendant’s right to compulsory 
process must prevail over the witness’s psychotherapist-patient 
privilege.”106 
The issue is not an easy one to resolve, but on balance, the 
latter view–allowing access–is correct.  First, the availability or 
extent of legal protection from disclosure should not depend on 
the fortuity of whether the witness obtained counseling from a 
state agency or a private practitioner or organization, 
particularly given that people of modest means may have no 
recourse but to rely on a public agency.  Second, most 
jurisdictions have created significant substantive requirements 
and procedural protections to prevent unjustified or excessive 
disclosure.107  Thus, this exception to the privilege applies only 
where legitimate doubts exist as to a government witness’s 
testimonial capacity or the truthfulness of a government 
witness’s testimony.  In such a case, to withhold such information 
from the jury creates too great a risk that an innocent defendant 
may be convicted. 
 
the right to compel attendance of defense witnesses, but also the right to introduce 
their testimony into evidence.  Washington, 388 U.S. at 23. 
 To this list of decisions it is appropriate to add Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 
U.S. 319 (2006).  At his trial for murder, sexual assault, robbery, and burglary, 
Holmes sought to offer evidence tending to show that someone else committed the 
crime, but the evidence was excluded.  Id. at 322–24.  The Supreme Court 
acknowledged the general validity of the principle that a court may exclude such 
evidence if the legitimate probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or the potential to mislead the jury, or 
the evidence is repetitive or only marginally relevant.  Id. at 326.  The Court 
unanimously held, however, that a South Carolina variation on the doctrine, which 
excluded evidence of another’s guilt if the State’s case was perceived to be 
particularly strong, was unconstitutional.  Id. at 329–31.  Exclusion, the Court 
insisted, could only be based on an evaluation of the evidence the defendant 
offered, not on the supposed strength of the evidence it was offered to counter.  Id. 
at 331. 
105 See Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563. 
106 Id.  The court also cited decisions by courts from several other states reaching 
the same conclusion.  See id. at 561–62. 
107 See infra Part V.B. 
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V 
PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
A.  Overview 
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the Supreme Court was called 
upon to establish the appropriate level of postconviction review 
of the records.108  A four-to-three plurality of the Court rejected 
the concept that the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause 
entitled a defendant to pretrial discovery; rather, it reasoned, the 
Confrontation Clause applies only at trial.109  A five-Justice 
majority concluded that, at least in the circumstances in that 
case, the defendant was not entitled to examine the records; 
instead, an in camera review of the records by the trial judge 
sufficed to protect the defendant’s right to due process.110 
Subsequent to Ritchie, defense attorneys naturally have 
sought to obtain the records (or at least an in camera review of 
them) in time for the defendant to use the records at trial.  
Numerous issues arise. 
1.  Disclosure to Counsel, or In Camera Review 
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Ritchie, argued that that only 
defense counsel, who is far more familiar with the facts and the 
defense strategy, can effectively evaluate the information.111  
Nevertheless, until December 2006, each of the states that 
permit any review of privileged records112 denied defense 
counsel the right to review such records.  Instead, the law in each 
such state was that if a defendant made an adequate preliminary 
showing, the trial court would have to conduct an in camera 
inspection of the kind approved in Ritchie.113 
 
108 See 480 U.S. 39 (1987). 
109 See id. at 998–1000; see generally supra Part III.A. 
110 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58, 61.  Justice Blackmun, concurring in the result, 
provided the fifth vote for the in camera procedure.  See also supra Part III.B.2–3. 
111 See supra Part III.B.1. 
112 Recall that some states permit no review whatsoever of records protected by 
an absolute privilege, unless the witness waives the privilege.  See supra Parts 
IV.A.1–2. 
113 Each state court opinion I have read that discusses the issue so holds.  See, 
e.g., People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 249 (Cal. 2002); People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 
986, 993 (Cal. 1997); State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004); State v. 
Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001); State v. Bruno, 673 A.2d 1117, 1124 n.11 
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In December of 2006, however, in Commonwealth v. Dwyer,114 
Massachusetts’s highest court abrogated its prior decisions on 
the subject,115 and held that once a defendant makes a sufficient 
showing of need,116 defense counsel, not the judge, should make 
the preliminary examination of the witness’s records.117  The 
court explained: 
 Experience has . . . confirmed that trial judges cannot 
effectively assume the role of advocate when examining 
records.  Requiring judges to take on the perspective of an 
advocate is contrary to the judge’s proper role as a neutral 
arbiter.  Despite their best intentions and dedication, trial 
judges examining records before a trial lack complete 
information about the facts of a case or a defense to an 
 
(Conn. 1996); State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); State v. 
Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 131–33 (Haw. 2003); Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866 (Md. 
1995); People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994); Cox v. State, 2001-
KA-01427-SCT (¶¶ 52–54) (Miss. 2003); State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 26 (Mo. 
2004) (en banc); State v. Hoag, 749 A.2d 331, 333 (N.H. 2000); State v. Gagne, 612 
A.2d 899, 901 (N.H. 1992); State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537–38 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1994); People v. Buchholz, 805 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005); 
State v. Black, 621 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bassine, 71 P.3d 
72, 75–76 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Dixon v. State, 923 S.W.2d 161, 166–67 (Tex. App. 
1996), vacated on other grounds, 928 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), on 
remand, 955 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. App. 1997), aff’d, 2 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1999); State v. Cramer, 2002 UT 9, ¶¶ 18–24, 44 P.3d 690, 695–96; State v. 
Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064, 1076–77 (Wash. 1993); State v. Diemel, 914 P.2d 779, 781 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, ¶¶ 34–35, 253 Wis. 2d 356, 
¶¶ 34–35, 646 N.W.2d 298, ¶¶ 34–35. 
114 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006). 
115 Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1996), abrogated by 
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 
617 N.E.2d 990 (Mass. 1993). 
116 See infra Part V.B.1. 
117 See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418–19.  The court primarily relied upon MASS. R. 
CRIM. P. 17(a)(2).  See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 414.  Rule 17, entitled “Summonses for 
Witnesses,” provides: 
(2) For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects.  A summons 
may . . . command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, 
papers, documents, or other objects designated therein.  The court on 
motion may quash or modify the summons if compliance would be 
unreasonable or oppressive or if the summons is being used to subvert the 
provisions of Rule 14.  The court may direct that books, papers, 
documents, or objects designated in the summons be produced before the 
court within a reasonable time prior to the trial or prior to the time when 
they are to be offered in evidence and may upon their production permit 
the books, papers, documents, objects, or portions thereof to be inspected 
and copied by the parties and their attorneys if authorized by law. 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 17(a)(2). 
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indictment, and are all too often unable to recognize the 




The court cited no studies or other authority to document that 
experience has shown that trial judges cannot adequately 
conduct the preliminary review.119  Nor did it discuss, or even 
cite, any of the numerous court decisions in other jurisdictions 
that have held to the contrary. 
In an appendix to its opinion, the court in Dwyer established 
specific, detailed, and elaborate procedures designed to protect 
against improper disclosure of presumptively privileged 
records.120  Initially, only defense counsel may inspect the 
records.121  “Before conducting any such inspection, counsel shall 
sign, as an officer of the court, and file a protective order 
containing stringent nondisclosure provisions.”122  In the 
protective order, the court must “prohibit counsel from copying 
any record or disclosing or disseminating the contents of any 
record to any person, including the defendant.”123  Information 
contained in the records may be copied or disclosed to the 
defendant or another person (such as an investigator) “if, and 
only if, a judge subsequently allows a motion for a specific, need-
 
118 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418 (citations omitted).  The court cited, after the 
second sentence, Commonwealth v. Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d 992, 1001 (1991), and 
quoted in a parenthetical:  “In our adversary system, it is enough for judges to 
judge.  The determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly and 
effectively be made only by an advocate.”  Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418 (quoting 
Stockhammer, 570 N.E.2d at 1001) (language originally from Dennis v. United 
States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966)). 
119 The court added:  “The absence of an advocate’s eye may have resulted in 
overproduction, as well as underproduction, of privileged records, and has 
repeatedly contributed to trial delays and appeals, jeopardizing the rights of 
defendants, complainants, and the public.”  Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 418.  The court 
cited no authority to substantiate these statements. 
120 Id. app.  The court first set out procedures to follow in determining whether 
the records were privileged and defense counsel’s access to them if the trial court 
concluded that they were not privileged.  Id. app. at 420–21; see infra Part V.A.3.  
Once the trial judge determines that the records are presumptively privileged, the 
Dwyer Appendix specifies where the records are to be kept and how they are to be 
marked.  See Dwyer, 895 N.E.2d 400 app. at 421. 
121 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d at 419. 
122 Id. 
123 Id.  Judges and counsel are required to report any violation of a protective 
order to the Board of Bar Overseers for disciplinary action.  Id. 
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based written modification of the protective order.”124  Similarly, 
counsel may introduce information from the records at trial only 
if counsel first files a motion in limine “at or before any final 
pretrial conference,”125 and the judge, after a hearing,126 
concludes that introduction of specific documents or information 
contained in the records “is necessary for the moving defendant 
to obtain a fair trial.”127 
Massachusetts’s highest court has done a superb job in 
drafting these procedures.  If defense counsel is to be given 
access to the witness’s privileged counseling records, it is difficult 
to imagine how to design a regime better calculated to protect 
those records from unnecessary or excessive disclosure.  
Nevertheless, Massachusetts’s decision to allow defense counsel 
to review the records without prior judicial screening is poor 
public policy for at least three reasons.  First, it may not 
adequately protect the records from unauthorized disclosure 
because enforcement of the protective orders may not be as 
absolute as the court supposes.  It is not unheard of for an 
unscrupulous attorney to leak protected information where he 
believes that doing so will help the client and the leak will not be 
traceable back to him.128 
Second, it may not adequately protect the records from 
unauthorized disclosure because human mistakes are inevitable.  
A clerk may mislabel the documents.  An attorney’s handwritten 
notes may be seen by outsiders.  An e-mail containing discussion 
 
124 Id.  “The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit explaining with 
specificity the reason why copying or disclosure is necessary; the motion and the 
affidavit shall not disclose the content of any presumptively privileged record.  
Counsel shall provide notice of the motion to all parties.”  Id. app. at 422. 
125 Id. 
126 Prior to ruling on defendant’s motion in limine, the prosecutor “shall be 
permitted to review enough of the presumptively privileged records to be able 
adequately to respond to the motion in limine, subject to signing and filing a 
protective order” similar to the one that defense counsel must sign.  Id. app. at 422–
23. 
127 Id. app. at 423.  “Before permitting the introduction in evidence of such 
records, the judge shall consider alternatives to introduction, including an agreed to 
stipulation or introduction of redacted portions of the records.”  Id. 
128 In a typical case, at least some of the information contained in the records is 
also likely to be known to the witness’s close friends or relatives, to those who 
provided the counseling, and to members of the counselor’s staff.  The existence of 
other potential sources for the leak will often make it difficult to positively identify 
the culprit. 
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of such matters, intended for a limited distribution, may be sent 
accidentally to a much-wider readership. 
Third, and most important, even if the Dwyer procedures do 
prevent unauthorized and unnecessary disclosure, the court 
failed to consider–indeed, expressed not a syllable of concern 
about–the impact they are likely to have on the witness.  
Consider the circumstance of a woman who has been raped.  The 
crime itself likely has had a traumatic, shattering, and destructive 
impact on her ability to live the life she had before it was 
committed.  In an effort to deal with and recover from her 
ordeal, she has undergone counseling, during which she may 
have disclosed information, thoughts, fears, and self-doubts of 
the most intensely personal and private kind.  It is bad enough 
that, come the trial, she must relive her ordeal before an 
audience of strangers, and that the judge will examine her 
records to determine whether they contain information that 
must be disclosed to the defense.  In Massachusetts, however, 
she must take the witness stand knowing that her rapist’s lawyer, 
whose primary responsibility is to attack her testimony, 
credibility and character, has read the entire file of her 
counseling.  The lawyers in the case may have every confidence 
that defense counsel has adhered and will adhere to the rules.  
To the witness, by contrast, this may provide little comfort 
compared to the sense of betrayal, humiliation, and exposure she 
is likely to experience. 
2.  Timing of In Camera Review 
Most courts that have discussed the issue have held that a 
defendant has no right to seek in camera review of a witness’s 
therapy or counseling records prior to trial; rather, the 
procedure may be invoked only after the witness has testified on 
direct.129 
 
129 See infra Part V.D. (discussing when, if ever, defense counsel can seek in 
camera review of the privileged records by the court). 
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3.  Determining Whether a Privilege Protects the Records130 
To assess whether a privilege protects the witness’s records, a 
trial court should apply the following procedure: 
(1) A defendant seeking a complainant’s or other witness’s 
counseling records pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 17 or a state equivalent must file a motion with the 
court specifying the entity that holds the records and the name 
of the witness, “and describing, as precisely as possible, the 
records sought.”131  The motion must be accompanied by an 
affidavit setting forth the defendant’s factual basis to believe that 
the records contain information to which the defendant must 
have access in order to receive a fair trial. 
(2) The defendant must serve the motion and affidavit on the 
prosecutor and any codefendants.  The prosecutor in turn must 
forward copies to the record holder and, if possible, the 
witness,132 and notify them of the time and date that a hearing 
will be held on the motion for the subpoena.133 
 
130 As will be apparent in the following footnotes, the rest of this subsection relies 
heavily on a detailed set of procedures developed over the course of many opinions 
by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the most recent of which, 
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 (Mass. 2006), abrogated many aspects of 
what state courts referred to as the “Bishop-Fuller” protocol.  See Commonwealth 
v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1996); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 617 N.E.2d 
990, 997–98 (Mass. 1993); see also Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 780 N.E.2d 453, 459–
65 (Mass. 2002); see generally Ellen M. Crowley, Note, In Camera Inspections of 
Privileged Records in Sexual Assault Trials:  Balancing Defendants’ Rights and State 
Interests Under Massachusetts’s Bishop Test, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 131 (1995). 
131 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420. 
132 Cases may arise in which the individual whose records are sought is not a 
witness, for example where that person is dead or incompetent to testify.  The 
procedures outlined herein should be adaptable to cover that situation as well. 
133 See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420.  In Massachusetts, the prosecutor must 
also inform the record holder and witness that: 
(i) [T]he . . . hearing shall proceed even if either is absent; (ii) the hearing 
shall be the [witness’s] only opportunity to address the court; (iii) any 
statutory privilege applicable to the records sought shall remain in effect 
unless and until the [witness] affirmatively waives any such privilege, and 
that failure to attend the hearing shall not constitute a waiver of any such 
privilege; and (iv) if the [witness] is the [alleged] victim in the case, he or 
she has the opportunity to confer with the prosecutor prior to the hearing. 
Id. 
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(3) The subpoena must direct that the records be submitted to 
the court, not to the defendant who obtained the subpoena.134 
(4) Prior to the hearing, neither the parties nor the court may 
inspect the records.135 
(5) At the hearing on the defendant’s motion, all parties, the 
record holder, and the witness may be heard as to whether the 
record is privileged136 and, if so, whether the defendant has made 
a showing sufficient to require an in camera inspection of the 
records by the trial court. 
(6) The judge issues findings of fact and law, setting forth 
whether the records are or are not privileged.137 
 
134 Federal case law suggests that when a defendant subpoenas evidence using 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c), the evidence must be delivered to the court directly, and not 
defense counsel.  See United States v. Santiago-Lugo, 904 F. Supp. 43, 46 (D.P.R. 
1995) (stating “[n]owhere in Fed.R.Crim.P. 17 do we find language allowing the 
utilization of the court’s subpoena power privately, with a secret return directly to 
an attorney”); United States v. Najarian, 164 F.R.D. 484, 487 (D. Minn. 1995) (“As 
we read the plain language of Rule 17(c), the documents being subpoenaed are ‘to 
be produced before the court.’”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1) (stating that 
“[w]hen the items arrive, the court may permit the parties and their attorneys to 
inspect all or part of them”). 
 This discussion from Najarian was approved more recently by the Federal 
District Court for the District of Minnesota.  See United States v. Agboola, No. 00-
100-JRT/FLN, 2001 WL 1640094, at *6 (D. Minn. Oct. 31, 2001) (“[T]he Court 
would find no reason to grant Agboola’s request to deliver the documents directly 
to his counsel.  The plain language of Rule 17(c) requires subpoenaed documents 
‘to be produced before the court.’” (citing Najarian, 164 F.R.D. at 487)). 
 Moreover, the court in Santiago-Luga also suggests that when a subpoena is used 
under Rule 17(c), notice must be made to all parties, parallel to the mandate of 
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(b)(1).  See Santiago-Luga, 904 F. Supp. at 47 (finding that civil 
subpoenas issued for the criminal action were improper for, among other things, 
failure to provide notice to all parties). 
 State courts also have addressed the issue.  See State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, 125 
P.3d 878, discussed infra note 139. 
135 Because most states require the defendant to make a sufficient showing of 
need even to trigger an in camera review of the records by the trial judge, it follows 
that no one should examine the records unless and until that showing is made.  
Massachusetts requires that defense counsel be allowed to examine the records in 
camera, but only after an adequate showing of need.  There, too, it follows that the 
records are off-limits to all participants unless that showing is made. 
136 Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420. 
137 In Massachusetts the judge must state whether any given record is not 
privileged, or “presumptively privileged.”  Id. app. at 420.  In that state, defense 
counsel, upon signing a protective order, is entitled to inspect presumptively 
privileged records.  See supra Part V.A.1. 
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(7) If the records are not privileged, the defendant is entitled 
to review them without any judicial review or screening for 
relevance or a special showing of need.138 
(8) If defense counsel improperly obtains and examines 
records that are thereafter held to be privileged, the trial court 
should take measures to ensure that counsel does not use the 
improper information in any way in preparing or presenting the 
defense.139 
4.  Basis for Disclosure if the Record Is Privileged 
If the trial court concludes that the communications and 
records are privileged, a defendant is entitled to in camera 
review of the records140 and, thereafter, to disclosure of pertinent 
 
138 See Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400 app. at 420; State v. Davis, 186 S.W.3d 367, 372 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2005).  The trial court may nevertheless restrict public access or 
disclosure if the records contain confidential or personal information.  Dwyer, 859 
N.E.2d 400 app. at 421 n.5.  Such information should not be accessible to the public 
nor disclosed by defense counsel if it would be inadmissible on evidentiary grounds 
at trial.  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (admitting only relevant evidence); FED. R. 
EVID. 403 (authorizing a judge to exclude evidence whose relevance is substantially 
outweighed by various negative considerations, including the risk of unfair 
prejudice, confusion, waste of time, and the like); FED. R. EVID. 611(a) (directing 
the trial court to “exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment”). 
139 In State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, 125 P.3d 878, counsel filled out a subpoena 
directing the child sexual-abuse complainant’s records be delivered to him, not, as 
state rules required, to the court, and also violated state rules by failing to inform 
the prosecutor of the subpoena (thereby precluding the state from moving to 
quash).  Id. ¶ 12.  Counsel inspected the records before reporting the matter to the 
court.  Id. ¶ 15.  The trial judge pointed out that counsel had created “a possibly 
insurmountable conflict of interest,” because it was impossible to separate counsel’s 
knowledge of the privileged information from his knowledge of the rest of the case.  
Id. ¶ 18.  Counsel took the hint and moved to withdraw; the court granted the 
motion and appointed new counsel.  Id. ¶¶ 10–18.  On appeal, the state supreme 
court reached four significant conclusions.  First, the court held that such records 
must be deliverable to the court, not to counsel.  Id. ¶¶ 44–45.  Second, the fact that 
counsel sought to impeach the complainant’s credibility did not render her mental 
condition “an element of any claim or defense,” and therefore the case did not fall 
within an exception to the privilege for such records.  Id. ¶¶ 42–43.  Third, the court 
agreed that the trial judge properly granted a motion to quash the subpoena based 
on counsel’s improper conduct.  Id. ¶¶ 41, 45.  Fourth, because counsel voluntarily 
withdrew, this rendered moot the defendant’s assertion that the court denied him 
the right to counsel of his choice.  Id. ¶ 46. 
140 In most jurisdictions, this in camera review is performed by the trial judge, but 
Massachusetts permits it to be conducted by defense counsel under specified 
circumstances and conditions.  See supra Part V.A.1. 
FISHMAN.FMT 3/3/2008  8:31:03 AM 
2007] Access to Psychotherapy or Counseling Records 37 
portions of them, only if the defendant makes an adequate 
showing of necessity.141 
5.  Appellate Review 
A defendant may seek appellate review of a trial judge’s 
decision to disclose or withhold a witness’s records only if the 
defendant’s showing satisfied the standard referred to in the 
previous paragraph.  If that showing was sufficient and the 
defendant seeks review of the trial judge’s nondisclosure, the 
appellate court should “review the judge’s in camera decision 
making as to relevance within the scope of the proffer, using a 
deferential abuse of discretion standard.”142 
B.  Showing Required for In Camera Review and Disclosure 
1.  Overview 
What kind of preliminary showing must a defendant make to 
trigger an in camera review of a state witness’s mental-health or 
counseling records? 
On one point there appears to be a unanimous consensus.  In 
sexual-assault and child abuse cases, there is general agreement 
that a defendant must do more than speculate that, because the 
complainant has participated in counseling or therapy after the 
alleged assault, the records in question might contain statements 
about the incident or incidents that are inconsistent with the 
complainant’s testimony at trial.143 
 
141 See infra Part V.B (discussion of various standards employed by state and 
federal courts).  This Article, in turn, recommends that disclosure of privileged 
information by the trial judge is appropriate only when the information raises 
significant doubts about the truthfulness or accuracy of the witness’s testimony.  See 
infra Part V.C.1. 
142 Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 816 N.E.2d 1205, 1209 (Mass. 2004). 
143 People v. Foggy, 521 N.E.2d 86, 91–92 (Ill. 1988) (defendant charged with 
abducting and raping a twenty-six-year-old woman); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 
122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003) (rape of an adult woman); Goldsmith v. State, 651 
A.2d 866, 876–77 (Md. 1995) (defendant charged with raping and otherwise sexually 
abusing his stepdaughter from ages seven to fourteen; she was twenty-five years old 
at trial.); People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 576 (Mich. 1994) (intercourse with a 
fourteen-year-old girl); State v. Hoag, 749 A.2d 331, 332–33 (N.H. 2000) (sexual 
assault of a nine-year-old girl); State v. Gonzales, 1998-NMCA-026, ¶ 21, 912 P.2d 
297 (rape of an adult woman); People v. Bush, 788 N.Y.S.2d 258, 259 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005) (rape of fourteen-year-old girl); State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶¶ 19–24, 
63 P.3d 56 (sexual misconduct with a twelve-year-old girl); Farish v. 
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Because this assertion can be plausibly made in every sexual-
assault or child molestation case, if this was enough to trigger an 
in camera review, a court would be required to conduct the 
review in virtually every such case.144  Moreover, at least two 
courts have supported such decisions based on their belief that: 
[T]he role of rape crisis counselors is not to investigate the 
occurrence.  Rather, the primary purpose of the counseling is 
to help the victim understand and resolve her feelings about 
the event. Thus . . . an in camera inspection of counseling 
records would not likely result in the disclosure of any material 
useful to an accused.
145
 
Similarly, in prosecutions of other types of crimes, it does not 
suffice to allege that at some point in a witness’s life, he received 
treatment or counseling for an emotional or mental difficulty or 
drug or substance abuse.  To obtain an in camera review of the 
witness’s records, the defendant must make a more factually 
specific showing that the records will reveal some significant 
condition relevant to the witness’s credibility or the accuracy of 
his testimony.146 
 
Commonwealth, 346 S.E.2d 736, 737–38 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (rape of an adult 
woman); State v. Kalakosky, 852 P.2d 1064, 1076–77 (Wash. 1993) (rape; it is 
unclear which of the five victims’ records were sought–the victims ranged in age 
from thirteen to twenty-six); State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, ¶¶ 33, 37, 253 Wis. 
2d 356, ¶¶ 33, 37, 646 N.W.2d 298, ¶¶ 33, 37 (rape of a twelve-year-old girl; 
defendant’s argument that girl’s counseling records might contain statements 
inconsistent with what she told the police was “not even a close call”). 
144 See, e.g., Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d at 576; Kalakosky, 852 P.2d at 1076–77. 
145 Foggy, 521 N.E.2d at 91 (basing this conclusion on amicus briefs filed in the 
case); see also State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 416–17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) 
(basing this conclusion on the testimony of counselors at a hearing in the trial 
court).  On the other hand, query whether it is possible for the victim to 
“understand and resolve her feelings about the event” without some discussion of 
the event itself. 
146 See, e.g., State v. Joyner, 625 A.2d 791, 806 (Conn. 1993); see also State v. 
D’Ambrosio, 561 A.2d 422, 427 (Conn. 1989), abrogated by State v. Bruno, 673 
A.2d 1117 (Conn. 1996).  “We have never held that a history of alcohol or drug 
abuse or treatment automatically makes a witness fair game for disclosure of 
psychiatric records to a criminal defendant.”  Joyner, 625 A.2d at 806 (citations 
omitted). 
 Similarly, a Missouri court held, “[An allegation that] the records in dispute might 
have had a bearing on [a state witness’s] competency to testify,” absent some 
evidence that the “witness exhibits some mental infirmity and fails to meet the 
traditional criteria for witness competence,” is not enough to overcome the 
“presumption that a witness is competent to testify.”  State v. Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 
26–27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (witness in a murder trial). 
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There is, as one court has recognized, a kind of “Catch-22” to 
this:  a defendant is required to demonstrate that the 
information sought is material and favorable enough to require 
disclosure, even though he does not have access to the 
information.147  Yet there is general agreement that before a 
defendant can trigger an in camera review of the records, let 
alone win discovery of their contents, the defendant must do 
more than merely suggest they contain relevant information. 
As to how much more than probable relevance a defendant 
must show, no clear consensus has emerged.  Rather, courts have 
used a variety of terms to articulate the appropriate standard.  
These formulations vary in what the defendant must seek to 
show, and how persuasively the defendant must show it, in order 
to trigger the in camera review by the court.148 
 
147 State v. Bassine, 71 P.3d 72, 76 n.9 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).  The court stated: 
We recognize the Catch 22 quality to that test, which results from the 
conflict between a defendant’s constitutional right to produce witnesses in 
his favor and venerated evidentiary privileges.  The test acknowledges that 
the information sought is confidential, but nonetheless requires the party 
seeking the information to demonstrate that the information, which the 
party does not have access to, is material and favorable. 
Id. 
 Catch-22 is the title of Joseph Heller’s darkly comic novel about American 
servicemen in World War II.  JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (Simon & Schuster 
Paperbacks 2004) (1955).  One pilot persistently sought to be grounded on the 
grounds that he was insane: 
 There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a 
concern for one’s own safety in the face of dangers that were real and 
immediate was the process of a rational mind.  Orr was crazy and could be 
grounded.  All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no 
longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions.  Orr would be crazy 
to fly more missions and sane if he didn’t, but if he was sane he had to fly 
them.  If he flew them he was crazy and didn’t have to; but if he didn’t want 
to he was sane and had to. 
Id. at 46. 
148 The following is a representative sample: 
 A defendant must “make a preliminary showing that there is a reasonable ground 
to believe that the failure to produce the records would likely impair his right to 
impeach the witness.”  State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting 
State v. Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001)). 
 “To obtain in camera review of confidential communications or records under [an 
‘absolute’ privilege], a defendant must first establish a reasonable probability that 
the privileged matters contain material information necessary to his defense.”  
Pinder, 678 So. 2d at 417 (citation omitted). 
 A defendant must demonstrate that:  “1) [T]here is a legitimate need to disclose 
the protected information; 2) the information is relevant and material to the issue 
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How is one to rank, in difficulty of proof, “a reasonable 
ground to believe,”149 “a reasonable probability,”150 “a 
reasonable belief,”151 “a reasonable likelihood,”152 “a good-faith 
belief, grounded on some demonstrable fact,”153 and “reasonable 
certainty”?154  How is one to compare “‘would likely impair his 
right to impeach the witness,’”155 “material information 
necessary to [the] defense,”156 “information . . . relevant and 
 
before the court; and, 3) the party seeking to pierce the privilege shows by a 
‘preponderance of the evidence’ that ‘no less intrusive source’ for that information 
exists.”  State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (quoting 
United Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1984)) 
(quoted approvingly in State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003)). 
 “[I]n camera review of a witness’s psychotherapy records is authorized only upon 
receipt of evidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the records 
contain exculpatory evidence.”  Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 
(Ky. 2003).  “If the in camera inspection reveals exculpatory evidence, i.e., evidence 
favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment, including 
impeachment evidence, that evidence must be disclosed to the defendant if 
unavailable from less intrusive sources.”  Id. (citing Eldred v. Commonwealth, 906 
S.W.2d 694, 701 (Ky. 1994)). 
 “[A] defendant must establish a reasonable likelihood that the privileged records 
contain exculpatory information necessary for a proper defense.”  Goldsmith v. 
State, 651 A.2d 866, 877 (Md. 1995). 
 Defendant must make a “showing [of] a good-faith belief, grounded on some 
demonstrable fact, that there is a reasonable probability that the records are likely 
to contain material information necessary to the defense.”  People v. Stanaway, 521 
N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994).  Disclosure to defense counsel is permissible only if 
the trial judge has inspected the records and “is satisfied that the records reveal 
evidence necessary to the defense.”  Id. at 575. 
 A defendant must show “‘with reasonable certainty that exculpatory evidence 
exists which would be favorable to [the] defense.’”  State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 
19, 63 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ¶ 30, 982 P.2d 79) (alteration in 
original). 
 To obtain in camera review of the records, “a defendant must show a reasonable 
likelihood that the records will be necessary to a determination of guilt or 
innocence.”  State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, ¶ 32, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶ 32, 646 
N.W.2d 298, ¶ 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
149 Peeler, 857 A.2d at 841 (Connecticut). 
150 Pinder, 678 So. 2d at 417 (Florida). 
151 Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563 (Kentucky). 
152 Goldsmith, 651 A.2d at 877 (Maryland); Green, 2002 WI App. 68, ¶ 19 
(Wisconsin). 
153 Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d at 574 (Michigan). 
154 State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 19, 63 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Cardall, 1999 
UT 51, ¶ 30, 983 P.2d 79). 
155 State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting State v. Slimskey, 779 
A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001)). 
156 State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996). 
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material to the issue before the court,”157 “evidence favorable to 
the accused and material to guilt or punishment, including 
impeachment evidence,”158 “exculpatory information necessary 
for a proper defense,”159 “exculpatory evidence which is relevant 
and material to the issue of the defendant’s guilt,” i.e., “material 
information necessary to the defense,”160 “‘exculpatory evidence 
. . . which would be favorable to [the] defense’” 161 (is there any 
other kind of “exculpatory evidence”?), and “necessary to a 
determination of guilt or innocence”?162  And how is one to 
assess the sum, or quotient, of one from column A and one from 
column B? 
The extent to which these differences in language denote 
significant differences of substance can only be answered (if it 
can be answered at all!) by examining in detail how various 
courts have applied their standards to specific cases.  That is the 
subject of the next several sections. 
2.  Rape and Child Abuse Cases 
Where a defendant is charged with rape or with sexual abuse 
of a child, courts have given serious consideration to discovery 
requests in three relatively specific situations, as well as a variety 
of other circumstances. 
a.  Recantation or Other Contradictory Conduct 
Several courts have held that, where the defense makes a 
specific showing that the complainant may have recanted the 
allegation against the defendant, an in camera review of relevant 
records to ascertain whether the complainant likewise recanted 
her allegation during therapy or counseling is justified.163  The 
 
157 State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (New 
Jersey) (quoted approvingly in State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003)). 
158 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003). 
159 Goldsmith v. State, 651 A.2d 866, 877 (Md. 1995). 
160 People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 574 (Mich. 1994). 
161 State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 19, 63 P.3d 56 (quoting State v. Cardall, 1999 
UT 51, ¶ 30, 982 P.2d 79). 
162 State v. Green, 2002 WI App. 68, ¶ 19, 253 Wis. 2d 356, ¶ 19, 646 N.W.2d 298, 
¶ 19. 
163 See, e.g., State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 132–33 (Haw. 2003).  Peseti was charged 
with third-degree sexual assault for fondling his foster daughter.  Id. at 122.  The 
court held that, despite statutory privileges, the trial court violated defendant’s 
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same is true where the defendant proffers evidence that the 
complainant had not made such allegations during counseling or 
therapy, where her failure to do so implicitly contradicts the 
charges she has subsequently brought against the defendant.164  
 
rights under the state constitution’s confrontation clause in precluding defendant 
from asking the complainant on cross-examination whether she told her counselor 
that in fact the defendant had not touched her inappropriately.  See id. at 129–30.  
Counsel had learned of the alleged recantation from a social worker.  Id. at 123.  
Although a foster sister testified to similar recantations by the complainant, the 
sister’s animosity toward the complainant may have undermined the sister’s 
credibility with the jury; hence, excluding references to the exculpatory statement to 
the counselor was not harmless error.  Id. at 129–30. 
 In another case, the nine-year-old complainant told the police that the defendant 
penetrated her (which defendant denied), and caused her pain, but told a physician 
who examined her that there had been no penetration and no pain.  State v. Hoag, 
749 A.2d 331, 332 (N.H. 2000).  The court held that this sufficed to require an in 
camera inspection of her counseling records.  Id. at 333. 
164 See Missouri ex rel. White v. Gray, 141 S.W.3d 460, 466–67 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2004).  In 1991, White married McKenna, the mother of two young children.  Id. at 
462.  In 1995, White petitioned to adopt the children; McKenna supported the 
petition.  Id.  A state agency performed a home study and psychological testing, and 
filed a report with recommendations.  Id.  In January, 1996, the petition was 
approved.  Id.  In March of 1998, J.L., one of the children, told McKenna that since 
the summer of 1995 (a time that preceded the adoption), White had been touching 
her inappropriately.  Id.  The court held that White was entitled to disclosure of 
information in the state agency’s adoption file.  Id. at 467.  The opinion does not 
specify the file’s contents, but it is reasonable to conclude that it contained neither 
allegations by J.L. against White, nor anything else to suggest he had behaved 
improperly toward either of the children.  It is inconceivable that the state agency 
would have approved the adoption otherwise.  Incidentally, White had previously 
been convicted in the case, but the conviction was reversed because the prosecutor 
withheld information that the lead detective on the case was having an affair with 
McKenna during the investigation and trial–a fact that, the court noted laconically, 
“would have served to impeach the police work and [McKenna’s] testimony.”  Id. at 
462.  By the time the litigation concerning the file reached the appellate court, 
McKenna had married the detective.  See id. at 462 n.2.  (McKenna now shares the 
name of the lead detective, McKinley.)  All those who consider McKenna a good 
role model for her daughter are invited to meet in my upper-left-hand desk drawer.  
There should be plenty of room. 
 In another case, State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), 
prior to trial, the judge disclosed the complainant’s Division for Youth and Family 
Services file to both the prosecutor and defense counsel; the file indicated that the 
complainant told a psychologist that her accusations of sexual abuse by her 
stepfather were untrue.  Id. at 537–38.  At trial, however, the judge refused to 
permit counsel to elicit this information from the psychologist.  Id. at 535.  Held:  
the judge’s denial was reversible error.  Id. at 538.  Although the complainant had 
also recanted to other witnesses (family members), those recantations could be 
discounted as having been coerced; the same could not be said with regard to the 
recantation to the psychologist.  Id. 
 In State v. Speese, 528 N.W.2d 63 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995), rev’d, 545 N.W.2d 510 
(Wis. 1996), defendant allegedly assaulted the teenage complainant in January and 
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And more generally, evidence that a complainant acted in a way 
that is highly inconsistent with her allegations of sexual assault 
or extortion should suffice to require in camera inspection of 
records, at least where the complainant was in counseling or 
therapy at the same time as the alleged crimes and inconsistent 
conduct.165 
 
February of 1991; complainant was hospitalized in February of 1991.  Id. at 67.  Had 
she told hospital personnel about the alleged assault, they would have been obliged 
by law to report it to the police; yet no criminal investigation was initiated until the 
complainant’s mother reported the alleged assault in September of that year.  Id. at 
70.  From this, defendant argued, it was reasonable to infer that the complainant did 
not tell hospital personnel about the alleged assault, which in turn might persuade a 
jury to disbelieve her testimony that the assault occurred.  Id.  Instead, the trial 
court conducted an in camera inspection and concluded that the records contained 
nothing material.  Id. at 71.  An intermediate appellate court held that defendant 
had made an adequate preliminary showing, and that the trial court should have 
ruled that unless the complainant consented to an in camera inspection, she would 
not be permitted to testify.  Id.  The appellate court also inspected the records, 
concluded that they did contain information material to the defense, reversed the 
conviction, and remanded for a new trial with instructions that unless the 
complainant voluntarily consented to disclosure, she would not be permitted to 
testify at the retrial.  Id.  On appeal, the state supreme court reversed and reinstated 
the conviction, concluding that the error in not disclosing the information was 
harmless because the jury was well aware of the complainant’s inconsistent 
behavior and failure to inform hospital officials about the assault.  State v. Speese, 
545 N.W.2d 510, 513 (Wis. 1996). 
 In People v. Higgins, 784 N.Y.S.2d 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004), at defendant’s trial 
for sexually abusing his daughter from the time she was nine until she was fifteen 
(when she reported him to the police), defendant was permitted to elicit from her 
social workers that she was treated by them.  Id. at 234.  The court instructed the 
jury that the counselors would have been legally obligated to report any allegations 
of sexual abuse, and they made no such reports, from which, naturally, the 
defendant argued that she made no such allegations to them.  Id.  Held:  this 
testimony gave defendant all he was entitled to; the trial judge’s decision to deny 
discovery of her counseling records was therefore no abuse of discretion.  Id. 
165 See State v. Luna, 1996-NMCA-071, 122 N.M. 143, 921 P.2d 950.  
Complainant, a married woman, began an affair with a coworker, which lasted four 
years, then alleged that during most of that period the defendant extorted sexual 
favors from her by threatening to reveal nude pictures of her to her husband if she 
broke off the relationship.  Id. at 951.  During the period of supposed extortion, she 
entered counseling, and also wrote what she herself described as a “very emotional 
melodramatic letter telling [Defendant] of my love for him.”  Id. at 952 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).  The court held that this sufficed 
to justify an in camera inspection of her counseling records to determine whether 
they contained information material to the defense.  See id. at 953 (lower court did 
not abuse its discretion in granting access to counseling records when privilege was 
not asserted until after disclosure of records). 
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b.  Evidence of Behavioral, Mental, or Emotional Difficulties 
Courts have also mandated in camera review of a 
complainant’s counseling or therapy records where the defense 
offers evidence that the complainant has engaged in other 
behavior, particularly relating to sexual conduct, which, although 
not directly related to her allegations against the defendant, 
nonetheless casts doubts on the credibility of those allegations.  
One such situation arises where the defendant can show that the 
complainant has previously made a false rape accusation and 
underwent counseling at that time or at the time she filed 
charges against the defendant.166 
The same is true where the defendant makes a plausible 
showing of other sexually related behavior167 that has special and 
unusual relevance to the case at hand.168  In such circumstances, 
it is reasonable to believe that records of the complainant’s 
counseling during the period in question may contain 
information relevant to the credibility of the charges against the 
defendant.169 
 
166 See Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 816 N.E.2d 1205, 1209–10 (Mass. 2004).  Two 
men were accused of raping a seventeen-year-old girl; they claimed she consented.  
Id. at 1207.  The victim was being treated in the aftermath of surgery to remove a 
brain tumor.  Id.  The victim’s father had testified in the grand jury that the girl 
sometimes made up stories to get something she wanted, and a previous rape case 
involving the girl had been nolle prossed.  Id.  The court held that the trial judge 
properly concluded that this was an adequate showing to trigger an in camera 
review, id. at 1210, for “disclosure of information in the victim’s counseling records 
concerning her tendency to imagine or to fabricate, and any reference to the prior 
rape case,” id. at 1207.  See also 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA supra note 41, §§ 19:42–
47 (concerning the general question of whether evidence that a rape complainant 
has made prior rape accusations). 
167 As a rule, evidence of a sexual-offense complainant’s prior sexual behavior is 
inadmissible.  See generally FED. R. EVID. 412.  The subject is exhaustively covered 
in 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, § 19. 
168 See generally 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, §§ 19:51–55. 
169 See, e.g., People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1994).  In Stanaway, the 
court considered the issue in two unrelated cases involving defendants Stanaway 
and Caruso.  Id.  Caruso was charged with fondling his eight-year-old niece.  Id. at 
564.  Caruso alleged that the complainant was a “troubled, maladjusted child”; he 
asserted a “good-faith belief” that she had been sexually abused by her biological 
father, that the lack of any resolution to this incident may have prompted her to 
falsely accuse defendant and that she had written a letter to her mother’s boyfriend 
offering to have sex with him in his car.  Id. at 576–77.  The court held that these 
allegations “may have demonstrated a realistic and substantial possibility that the 
material he requested might contain information necessary to his defense,” and 
remanded for further action by the trial court.  Id.  (Noting that the statutory 
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c.  Complainant’s Ability to Perceive, Remember, and Relate 
Events 
Courts have likewise considered whether such review is 
required where specific evidence suggested that the 
complainant’s ability to perceive, remember, or relate events was 
uncertain.  At least one case has arisen involving each of the 
following: mental retardation,170 the effects of prescribed 
medication,171 drug and alcohol abuse,172 documented problems 
with memory,173 and other characteristics.174 
 
privileges in question were absolute in their terms, the court held that if the judge 
determined that the defendant was entitled to the records but the complainant 
refused to waive the privilege, the complainant’s testimony would be suppressed); 
see also supra Part IV.A. 
170 Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 661 N.E.2d 65, 67–69 (Mass. 1996) (holding, in 
essence, that where the defense has offered evidence suggesting that complainant 
was mildly retarded and sometimes had difficulty distinguishing reality from 
fantasy, an in camera inspection of the complainant’s mental-health records is 
justified). 
171 State v. Pandolfi, 765 A.2d 1037, 1043 (N.H. 2000).  When, on cross-
examination, the complainant in a sexual-assault case testified that she may have 
been confused about the dates because of the medication she was taking in 
connection with her counseling, this sufficed to require an in camera review of the 
counseling records to determine what medication, if any, the witness was taking, 
and to disclose that information to defense counsel.  Id. at 1042–43.  The court 
determined that the trial judge erred in refusing to disclose this portion of the 
records, but the trial judge was correct in refusing to disclose other aspects of the 
records to the defense.  Id. at 1043. 
172 See, e.g., State v. Gonzales, 1996-NMCA-026, 121 N.M. 421, 912 P.2d 297.  
Complainant admitted drinking four beers and two schnapps in the five hours 
immediately preceding her encounter with defendant, and defendant claimed 
(though the complainant denied) that they had consumed cocaine together before 
intercourse (which he claimed was consensual).  Id. ¶¶ 2–3.  Other evidence showed 
that the complainant had a history of blackouts from alcohol.  Id. ¶ 21.  Held:  it was 
no abuse of discretion to conclude that this justified requiring an in camera 
inspection of the complainant’s counseling records.  Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
173 State v. Pinder, 678 So. 2d 410, 417 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).  Defendant was 
charged with abducting the complainant, raping her, and shooting her in the head.  
Id. at 411.  The complainant testified that although she had problems with her 
memory generally as a result of her injuries, she remembered the incident in detail.  
Id.  The trial judge ordered an in camera review of the relevant records and 
subpoenaed the counselor to assist in that review; the State appealed.  Id. at 412.  
The appellate court held that defendant had failed to meet the “reasonable 
probability” test.  Id. at 413.  The court stressed that the sexual-assault counselor 
had testified that her primary function was to explain how a victim and her family 
get through the medical examinations, legal systems, and other repercussions of the 
assault, rather than to discuss the assault itself with her in any detail.  Id. at 411–12.  
“Given the function of counseling,” the court reasoned, “it is improbable that an in 
camera inspection of counseling records would uncover information critical to the 
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d.  Other Situations Involving Rape and Child Abuse Complaints 
Numerous other examples of judicial assessment of specific 
factual allegations in other circumstances exist.175 
3.  Criminal Cases Generally 
The question of defense access to mental therapy or 
counseling records arises less often, but still with some 
 
defense, irreplaceable by other means.”  Id. at 415–16.  The court noted that Florida 
procedure “provides for extensive discovery, and allows a defendant to take 
depositions of persons with information relevant to the offense charged, including 
the victim.  A defendant has access to unprivileged statements made by the victim 
to the police, her family or other witnesses.”  Id. at 416.  Thus, the defendant had 
ample other opportunities to obtain such information from unprivileged sources.  
Id. 
 In Wagner v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 352 (Ky. 1979), overruled on other 
grounds by Estep v. Commonwealth, 663 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1983), which preceded 
Ritchie by several years, the court held that the defendant was properly denied 
discovery of the psychiatric records of a charitable, private hospital, because the 
state did not have custody or control over the records.  Id. at 355.  The court held, 
however, that it was reversible error to preclude defendant from cross-examining 
the complainant about her psychiatric history where the proffered evidence would 
have established that she had been committed to a psychiatric hospital prior to the 
events at issue for attempted suicide, severe depression, and drug abuse, and that at 
the time of the alleged events, she was under psychiatric care and was receiving 
shock treatments that were affecting her memory.  Id. at 355. 
174 Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 816 N.E.2d 1205, 1207–09 (Mass. 2004); see also 
supra note 164. 
 For further information, see United States v. Diamond, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d 
Cir. 1992), and State v. Jackson, 862 A.2d 880, 889 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (“[T]he 
trial court must determine whether the records are especially probative of the 
witnesses’s capacity to relate the truth or to observe, recollect and narrate relevant 
occurrences . . . .” (quoting State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004))). 
175 For example, in State v. Behnke, 553 N.W.2d 265 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996), 
defendant was accused of raping complainant, hitting her on the face, eye, and 
chest, and biting her genital area; a physician testified that the day after the alleged 
attack, she had bruises and bite marks on those parts of her body.  Id. at 268.  
Defendant alleged that the complainant had previously told the defendant that she 
had a history of self-abuse that included inflicting cuts and bruises on her arms, and 
sought access to the complainant’s medical records, alleging that the records might 
show that the bruises in question were self-inflicted.  Id. at 269.  The court held that 
it was not error to refuse an in camera review of the records of complainant’s 
medical treatment following the rape.  Id.  First, the wounds confirmed by the 
doctor were radically different in kind than the self-inflicted kind about which she 
had told the defendant.  Id.  Second, they were of a kind that were unlikely to have 
been self-inflicted.  Id.  Third, despite defendant’s allegation that the complainant 
had a psychological disorder (based on the statements that she had made to him 
regarding her self-abuse), he had offered no evidence she sought and received 
mental-health counseling.  Id. 
FISHMAN.FMT 3/3/2008  8:31:03 AM 
2007] Access to Psychotherapy or Counseling Records 47 
frequency, in cases where the recipient of the therapy or 
counseling was only a witness, not a victim or complainant.  An 
in camera review of appropriate records is required where a 
defendant makes an adequate showing to suggest that the 
witness suffered from a significant impairment in testimonial 
capacity–that is, in the ability to perceive, remember, or 
accurately narrate what he has seen, done, and heard.176 
Less clear is whether a more generalized showing of 
emotional and mental difficulties or substance abuse suffices to 
require an in camera inspection.  A Connecticut murder case, 
State v. Bruno,177 illustrates the issue.  One of the State’s key 
witnesses (who was sixteen at the time of the crime) testified that 
he participated in beating the victim unconscious and then 
 
176 See, for instance, State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808, 841 (Conn. 2004), which held 
that the trial judge erred in precluding the defense’s use of records containing 
information that “both prior to and after the murders, [the witness] was diagnosed 
with significant mental disorders, including ‘cocaine induced psychiatric disorder 
with hallucinations,’ ‘chronic paranoid schizophrenia,’ ‘drug induced psychosis’ 
while using cocaine, and antisocial personality disorder.”  Id. at 842.  The court 
further held that, in light of other overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt, the 
error was harmless.  Id. at 844–46; see also Commonwealth v. Feliciano, 667 N.E.2d 
847, 855 (Mass. 1996); State v. Pandolfi, 765 A.2d 1037 (N.H. 2000); infra Part 
V.B.2.b. (discussion of Pandolfi and Feliciano). 
 In another case, Bobo v. State, 349 S.E.2d 690, 692 (Ga. 1986) (pre-Ritchie 
plurality opinion), Bobo was charged with burglary, and with murdering a police 
officer and wounding his partner when they went to investigate.  Id. at 691.  Officer 
Sullivan, the surviving officer, was the State’s main witness.  Id.  Defendant 
established that Officer Sullivan suffered from posttraumatic stress syndrome as a 
result of the event.  Id.  At a hearing to determine discovery and admissibility of 
Officer Sullivan’s mental therapy, psychiatrists testified that she had difficulty 
concentrating and remembering, but that no evidence showed directly that she was 
unable to identify the defendant as the perpetrator or was unsure about her 
identification of him.  Id. at 693.  Moreover, other information was available at trial 
to impeach the officer’s ability to identify the assailant.  Id. at 693–94.  A plurality of 
the court concluded that “the defendant has failed to show the necessity for the 
admission of this privileged information and the trial court properly refused to grant 
his request.”  Id. at 694.  In Lucas v. State, 555 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. 2001), the Georgia 
Supreme Court noted the Bobo plurality opinion and applied it to the case at hand, 
concluding that the trial judge had correctly concluded that records of a 
codefendant’s psychiatric and psychological counseling contained nothing 
exculpatory.  Id. at 446. 
 And see Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 661 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1996), in essence 
holding that where the defense has offered evidence suggesting that the 
complainant, who was mildly retarded, sometimes had difficulty distinguishing 
reality from fantasy, an in camera inspection of the complainant’s mental-health 
records is justified.  Id. at 70–71. 
177 673 A.2d 1117 (Conn. 1996). 
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helped the defendant dispose of the body and other evidence.178  
The defendant (a man in his thirties)179 offered evidence that the 
witness had persistent attitude and behavioral problems in 
school, had used intravenous drugs and was drinking heavily 
around the time of the murder, had received psychiatric 
treatment, and was placed in the special-education program.180  
The other witness, defendant’s eighteen- or nineteen-year-old 
girlfriend, testified that she knew in advance of defendant’s 
intent to kill the victim, and witnessed the crime.181  Defendant 
established that she, too, had a series of mental and emotional 
difficulties.182  The court, emphasizing that “what is at issue is the 
existence of a mental problem that may bear on the witness’ [sic] 
testimonial capacity, not the witness’ [sic] general character or 
intelligence,”183 concluded that the defendant failed to establish 
a “reasonable ground” to believe that the witnesses’ therapy and 
counseling records would reveal any significant shortcomings in 
their capacity to perceive, remember, and relate what happened, 
and therefore upheld the trial judge’s refusal to conduct an in 
camera examination of the witnesses’ records.184  A dissenting 
judge protested that the court had applied too rigid a standard,185 
 
178 See id. at 1122. 
179 Id.  Defendant claimed no memory of the events in question, and 
hypothesized that the two witnesses had committed the crime themselves.  Id. at 
1123. 
180 Id. at 1126–27. 
181 Id. at 1133. 
182 Id. at 1125–26.  In her initial statements to the police, the witness lied about 
several aspects of the murder.  Id. at 1125 n.13.  She had been enrolled in a special-
education program in high school because she was unable to learn academic 
subjects as rapidly as other students.  Id. at 1125.  She admitted having trouble 
“recalling things,” but denied that this difficulty interfered generally with her ability 
to recall or relate the events of her life.  Id.  Approximately four years prior to the 
murder, she received three weeks of inpatient psychiatric treatment at a hospital for 
depression, followed by a few months of outpatient treatment, and thereafter 
consulted from time to time with a psychologist or social worker (the record was 
unclear as to which) to deal with problems she had getting along with people.  Id. at 
1125–26. 
183 Id. at 1126. 
184 Id. at 1127 (regarding the girlfriend); see also id. at 1126–27 (regarding the 
sixteen-year-old accomplice).  As to each witness, the court stressed that the school 
counselor testified at the hearing that neither witness had demonstrated problems 
in perceiving, remembering, or relating information.  Id. at 1125–27. 
185 Id. at 1140 (Berdon, J., dissenting).  Specifically, the dissent noted: 
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which improperly required the defendant to establish as fact the 
very information for which he was requesting an in camera 
review of the records.186 
Other courts have been less demanding in similar 
circumstances.187  Indeed, in a later case, Connecticut’s Supreme 
Court held it was error to deny the defendant the right to 
introduce information gleaned from such records that indicated 
a witness’s substantial problems with substance abuse at the time 
of the events in question and at the time of the trial.188 
 
The majority seems to lose sight that this threshold showing is preliminary.  
It is not determinative of whether the records are available for use by the 
defendant's counsel in his or her cross-examination of a witness.  Rather, 
the showing merely allows an in camera inspection to determine whether 
any admissible impeaching evidence is contained in the records. 
Id. 
186 Id.  The dissent also objected that the trial judge had placed unfair restrictions 
on the defendant’s ability to elicit the very information he needed to make the 
required showing.  Id. 
187 See, e.g., People v. Dace, 449 N.E.2d 1031 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983), aff’d, 470 
N.E.2d 993 (Ill. 1984).  In Dace, the testimony of an accomplice was the sole 
evidence that the defendant had committed a burglary.  Id. at 1032–33.  A year and 
a half before the burglary, the accomplice had been adjudged dangerous to others 
and was involuntarily committed to a mental-health hospital.  Id. at 1035.  The trial 
judge precluded the defense from discovering any information about the witness’s 
mental health or from questioning the witness about it on cross-examination, ruling 
that the information was too old to be relevant.  Id. at 1033.  The appellate court 
held that, given the arguable relevance of the information, it was error to preclude 
discovery and to prohibit defendant from raising the issue at trial.  Id. at 1035.  The 
state supreme court agreed that, “under the circumstances shown by the evidence, 
the refusal to permit the discovery was reversible error.”  Id. at 996.  (Note that the 
Dace decisions preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie v. Pennsylvania, 
480 U.S. 39 (1987)). 
188 State v. Francis, 836 A.2d 1191 (Conn. 2003).  The court observed: 
Where, as in the present case, . . . the trial court does examine the records 
and those records indicate a long, persistent and serious history of alcohol 
and drug abuse and blackouts, and evidence was presented that the witness 
was drinking at the relevant times in question, common sense dictates that 
a jury should have that information before it in order properly to gauge the 
witness’ [sic] general credibility. 
Id. at 1201.  This was particularly so, the court held, because based on the trial 
judge’s ruling, the jury could get the impression that the witness had only begun to 
drink heavily after his mother’s death.  Id.  Francis was on trial for killing the 
witness’s mother; the witness provided important testimony suggestive of Francis’s 
guilt.  Id. at 1195.  The court held, however, that in light of overwhelming evidence 
of Francis’s guilt, the error was harmless.  Id. 
 Other courts have decided the issue of what evidence to submit to the jury 
similarly.  See, e.g., People v. Di Maso, 426 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
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4.  “Unavailable from Less Intrusive Sources” 
A number of courts have held that, even if the requisite 
standard for in camera review has been established, the 
defendant is entitled to disclosure only if comparable evidence is 
“unavailable from less intrusive sources.”189  This is an entirely 
appropriate requirement.  Courts should recognize, however–
and many do–that it is necessary to assess not only whether a 
defendant has other evidence to make the same factual claim, 
but also whether the evidence available from less intrusive 
sources has persuasive power comparable to that in the 
privileged material.190 
C.  Proposed Standards for In Camera Review and Disclosure 
The preceding review of the various standards imposed by 
state and federal courts demonstrates that there is no clear 
consensus of what showing the defendant should be required to 
make in order to trigger in camera review.  The variation in the 
terms used for the standards, alone, demonstrates the confusion 
in this area.191  Similarly, courts have used a variety of terms to 
describe when, after such a review, the judge must disclose 
information to the defense.192  Rather than choose among these 
various standards, I propose the following:193 
 
189 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003); accord State v. 
Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003); State v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
190 Thus, in Peseti, even though the defendant had already elicited from the 
defendant’s foster sister that complainant had recanted her sexual-abuse allegation, 
that witness’s animosity toward the complainant may have undermined the sister’s 
credibility with the jury.  Therefore, excluding references to the exculpatory 
statement made to the counselor was not harmless error.  See Peseti, 65 P.3d at 129–
30. 
 Similarly, in L.J.P., although the complainant had also recanted to other 
witnesses (family members), those recantations could be discounted as having been 
coerced.  The same could not be said with regard to a recantation to a state agency’s 
psychologist; hence, exclusion of the latter was reversible error.  See L.J.P., 637 
A.2d at 537–38. 
191 See, e.g., supra notes 148–162 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 153–160. 
193 A critic might well ask:  “Given the hodgepodge of standards and verbal 
formulas already cluttering up the law, why not choose the best among the existing 
ones, instead of proposing yet two more?  Why add to the confusion?”  My flippant 
answer is:  “Because I am a law professor, and adding to the confusion is what law 
professors do best.”  Seriously, though, I believe (and hope) these proposals will 
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(1) A judge must disclose information to the defense that is 
otherwise protected by a patient-psychotherapist or similar 
privilege194 if the information casts significant doubts upon the 
truthfulness or accuracy of the witness’s testimony. 
(2) The judge must conduct an in camera review of the 
records if defense counsel makes a factually specific showing of 
probable cause that such information will be found in those 
records. 
Defense counsel’s ultimate goal is not merely in camera 
review, but disclosure.  Because it is necessary to define the 
standard for disclosure in order to assess what counsel must 
show to trigger a review, I will first discuss the disclosure 
standard and then discuss what defense counsel must show to 
require the judge to examine the records. 
1.  Recommended Standard for Disclosure:  Information Raising 
Significant Doubts upon the Truthfulness or Accuracy of the 
Witness’s Testimony 
As noted earlier, courts have used a variety of terms to 
describe the kind of information a judge must disclose to the 
defense.195  At first glance, proposing the above standard may 
seem strange.  The Supreme Court, in Ritchie, applied a 
materiality test.196  This standard has been applied by other 
courts197 and supported by scholars and commentators.198  A 
reader might reasonably ask:  why propose a different 
definition? 
The difficulty is that, at least in this context, “materiality” is a 
retrospective standard.199  In Ritchie, the Court held that 
 
add greater clarity to the issues than any of the standards and verbal formulas 
currently in use. 
194 By “similar privilege” I mean the various privileges discussed above, whether 
“absolute” or “qualified” in nature.  See supra Part II.B. 
195 See supra notes 153–160. 
196 Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 58 (1987) (plurality opinion). 
197 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 667 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Mass. 1996) 
(inquiring before a judge conducts in camera review whether the evidence will 
contain something material to defense). 
198 See, e.g., Hebert, supra note 23, at 1478 (advocating for disclosure of 
privileged material only where the privileged material contains “relevant and 
material evidence that would be admissible at trial”). 
199 Note, however that the materiality standard will first be applied prospectively, 
where the trial court determines for the first time whether the information sought 
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“Ritchie is entitled to have the CYS file reviewed by the trial 
court to determine whether it contains information that probably 
would have changed the outcome of his trial.”200  This standard is 
not readily applicable to the midtrial (and occasionally pretrial) 
decisions that a trial judge must make to disclose or withhold 
information.  Moreover, applied prospectively, the Ritchie 
definition of materiality–“information that probably [will] 
change the outcome of [the] trial”201–sets the bar too high and 
requires too much speculation on the part of the judge.202 
As discussed earlier, information contained in a prosecution 
witness’s counseling or therapy records is likely to be relevant 
only to the extent that it undermines or impeaches that witness’s 
testimony.203  Thus, the appropriate standard should be 
expressed in that context:  information in such records should be 
disclosed to the defense only if, and to the extent, it raises 
significant doubts upon the truthfulness or accuracy of an 
important government witness’s testimony.204  The 
 
will be material to the defense.  See DiBlasio v. Keane, 932 F.2d 1038, 1041–42 (2d 
Cir. 1991) (stating that the trial judge will make the initial determination regarding 
whether the evidence will be material to the defense).  The retroactive application 
arises where the trial judge’s decision is reviewed on appeal.  See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 
58. 
200 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 (emphasis added). 
201 Id. 
202 For example, a judge might conclude that information highly damaging to a 
witness’s credibility might not change the outcome because, in the judge’s opinion, 
the State’s case is very strong.  But the Court rejected such thinking in 2006 in 
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).  See supra note 104.  Conversely, a 
judge who expects the defendant to be acquitted even without the information 
might opt not to disclose it on the assumption that defense counsel does not need it.  
This, too, would be an improper basis on which to withhold the information. 
203 See Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 562 (Ky. 2003) (“The 
relevancy of evidence to a witness’s credibility is universally recognized . . . .”). 
204 Courts frequently address the issue in terms of “a witness’s credibility.”  See, 
e.g., Barroso, 122 S.W.3d at 563–64 (allowing the judge to review in camera the 
records to examine whether they contained “exculpatory evidence,” such as 
evidence affecting witness’s credibility).  I avoid using the word “credibility” 
because, in this context, it is both too broad and too vague.  Suppose, for example, 
the records reveal that a rape complainant tells people her father died when she was 
a teenager because she is ashamed to acknowledge that in fact he is serving a life 
sentence after several convictions for armed robbery.  Or suppose a homicide 
witness persists in saying that he was a star athlete in high school, even though he 
actually occupied the bench often enough that by graduation, he had a legitimate 
adverse-possession claim.  Such information is arguably relevant to the witness’s 
“credibility” because it suggests that he or she will lie in order to improve how he or 
she is perceived by others.  But although a judge would have discretion to permit 
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determination will be based on such indicia as certain medical 
conditions, prior contradictory information, or other indications 
of a witness’s inability to testify accurately,205 and is consistent 
with general principles of evidence law.206 
2.  Recommended Standard for In Camera Review:  Probable 
Cause 
It is clear that courts should not conduct a review of a 
witness’s records every time that the defendant requests it.  To 
do so would accord insufficient significance to the privacy of the 
complainants and witnesses whose records are at issue,207 and in 
addition could impose an undue burden on the judiciary.208  
Rather, a defendant should be required to offer evidence that 
adequately suggests the records contain information that 
satisfies the “significant doubts” standard described above.209  
This must involve more than merely showing that the witness 
received mental-health care or counseling of some kind.210  
However, a defendant should not be required to prove that the 
 
defense counsel to cross-examine the witness about these lies if the counsel learned 
about them from an unprivileged source, see for example, FED. R. EVID. 608(b), 
surely this information has so little relevance in assessing whether the witness 
testified truthfully and accurately about the defendant’s alleged crime that it would 
be absurd to pierce the privilege of a witness’s therapy or counseling records to 
disclose such information to the defense.  (After all, don’t we all stretch the truth 
from time to time?)  (By the way, although the “author’s dagger” does not say so, 
George Lucas wanted me to play Han Solo in Star Wars (20th Century Fox 1977), 
and hired Harrison Ford only after I turned him down.)  Expressing the standard in 
terms of the “truthfulness or accuracy of the witness’s testimony,” rather than the 
witness’s “credibility,” makes it clear that the focus is on the testimony, rather than 
the witness’s character for truthfulness per se.  Thus, if the records also reveal that 
the rape complainant frequently and compulsively claims she was forced by others 
to do things she did voluntarily but now regrets, or that the homicide witness has 
significant difficulty in perceiving and recalling events accurately, or that a witness 
has a particular reason for lying about the events in this particular case, the judge 
would be obliged to disclose such information. 
205 See supra Part V.B.2.c.; see also Barroso, 122 S.W.2d at 562 (citing case law for 
situations where a witness’s capacity is relevant). 
206 See supra Part V.B.2.c. 
207 See State v. Spath, 1998 ND 133, ¶ 18, 581 N.W.2d 123, 126.  (“[H]aving the 
trial court review confidential material is not a right.  It is a discovery option, but 
only after certain prerequisites are satisfied.” (quoting State v. Hummel, 483 
N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992))). 
208 Cf. infra Part V.D. 
209 See supra Part V.C.1. 
210 See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text. 
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information does exist, nor, necessarily, establish the precise 
nature of the information that is sought.  Courts and legislatures 
should keep in mind that this is a preliminary showing that 
affords a defendant no more than a judicial in camera 
examination of the records.  In camera examination does intrude 
into the witness’s privacy, but the intrusion is comparatively 
minor and controlled and will go no further (other than review 
on appeal) unless the records contain information that in fact 
satisfies the “significant doubts” standard.  Accordingly, the 
required showing must protect against “fishing expeditions” but 
also accommodate the defendant’s lack of concrete 
knowledge.211 
Each of the verbal formulas that courts have developed to 
describe the appropriate standard suffers from the same 
weakness:  a lack of precision.  Take the formula proposed by 
Kentucky’s Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Barroso:  
“[E]vidence sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the 
records contain exculpatory evidence.”212  The difficulty, of 
course, is that the key phrase in this formula, “reasonable 
belief,” is not self-defining, and therefore, as a practical matter, 
the standard defines very little.  Every other definition coined by 
the nation’s courts to deal with this situation suffers from a 
similar shortcoming.213 
In that regard, this area of the law reminds me of the Fourth 
Amendment phrase, “probable cause,” which is the factual 
justification generally required to arrest or search.214  The most 
recent, and perhaps the most precise, definition of that phrase 
offered by the Supreme Court, with regard to probable cause to 
search, is:  “Probable cause exists when ‘there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
 
211 See also Hebert, supra note 23, at 1472. 
212 Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003). 
213 See supra notes 148–62 and accompanying text. 
214 According to the Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  As a prosecutor and law professor, I have used, litigated, 
taught, and written about the Fourth Amendment for nearly four decades. 
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in a particular place.’”215  Presumably, “a fair probability” means 
less than “more probable than not,”216 the preponderance-of-
the-evidence standard sufficient to win a verdict in most civil 
litigation, and the standard federal courts apply in determining 
whether the factual requirements of an evidence rule have been 
satisfied.217  “Probable cause,” after all, determines only whether 
the authorities may look for evidence, not whether it can be 
introduced.218  In essence, therefore, “probable cause” means 
“substantially more than a mere suspicion, hunch, speculation, 
or inference, but substantially less than ‘more probable than 
not.’”219 
Thus defined, probable cause strikes me as an appropriate 
standard to apply to a defense counsel’s motion for an in camera 
 
215 United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
213, 238 (1983) (emphasis added)).  The Court has steadfastly refused to put a 
mathematical value on probable cause. 
216 For a general discussion of the requisite degree of probability the Fourth 
Amendment requires, see 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2(e), 
at 66–90 (4th ed. 2004). 
217 See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176–77 (1987) (holding that 
before the government may introduce evidence pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(E), the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, it must persuade the 
judge by a preponderance of the evidence that the factual requirements of that 
exception–that a conspiracy existed, the declarant and the nondeclarant defendant 
against whom it was offered were both members of the conspiracy, and the 
statement was made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy–have been 
satisfied). 
218 Several years ago, I proposed a question to criminal procedure professors on a 
listserve:  based on your reading of Supreme Court and lower court opinions on the 
subject, if you had to define “probable cause” numerically (10 percent probable? 60 
percent probable?), where would you put it? (I did so at the end of a semester, 
while grading exams, and received two dozen or so answers.  Law professors are 
desperate for distractions at that time of year.)  As I recall, the consensus was at 
about 30 percent.  I did not archive the results, which, I acknowledge, reflect no 
more than the opinions of those who bothered to answer.  Still, perhaps there is 
some small significance that this self-selected group of Fourth Amendment scholars 
understand the law to permit the government to search someone’s home, office, car, 
etc.–i.e., to intrude substantially into that person’s privacy–if it marshals facts that 
show a 30 percent probability that particularly described evidence of a particular 
crime or type of crime would be found. 
219 This definition is of my own devising.  I am aware of no court decision or 
scholarly article that has offered it or anything like it.  However, case law applies a 
flexible standard for probable cause.  See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160 (1949) (“The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception 
affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often 
opposing interests.”).  For an excellent overview of how courts have viewed 
probable cause, see 2 LAFAVE, supra note 216, § 3.2, at 24–35. 
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review of a government witness’s counseling records, which, like 
the search of someone’s home or office, is a significant intrusion 
into privacy. 
I acknowledge that, for several reasons, the analogy is far 
from exact.  First, the purpose of a physical search and seizure is 
to seek out evidence of a crime or evidence connecting a suspect 
with a crime.  The purpose of the examination of records is to 
look for evidence that tends to impeach testimony that a crime 
was committed220 or that the defendant committed it.221  Second, 
in the case of a search, the person whose privacy is invaded is 
usually suspected of wrongdoing.222  With regard to the records, 
the person suffering the intrusion is often a crime victim223 or 
someone who coincidentally happened to be at the scene of the 
crime.  Third, a physical search usually intrudes upon no special, 
privileged, therapeutic relationship.  An examination of records 
does precisely that.  Each of these differences arguably militates 
against applying the analogy. 
There is, however, a consideration that perhaps offsets these 
factors.  A typical search is conducted by several police officers, 
who inevitably see and learn much about the targeted individual 
beyond that for which they are looking.  So long as they acted 
within the scope of the warrant, what they see or learn is fair 
game to be used at trial or in subsequent investigations.224  Thus, 
 
220 This typically is the situation in a rape case where a defendant denies that 
intercourse occurred or claims the complainant consented, and child abuse cases 
where the defendant denies that he did what the child alleges.  See supra Part 
V.B.2.a. 
221 This situation exists where a crime unquestionably was committed (for 
example, an assault, or a homicide where the victim was shot or stabbed to death), 
but defendant challenges the accuracy of a witness’s testimony identifying him as 
the perpetrator. 
222 Although police may obtain a warrant to search the premises of a third party 
not suspected of wrongdoing, see Zurcher v. Standford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 559–60 
(1978), in the overwhelming majority of cases (ninety-nine percent or more in my 
experience as a prosecutor, and an equal proportion of the reported opinions I have 
read in my nearly thirty years as a professor and author of Fourth Amendment-
related issues), the warrant is directed at a location occupied or used by a suspect. 
223 Such is the case in rape and child abuse cases.  See generally Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43–44 (1987) (plurality opinion) (child sexual abuse); United 
States v. Doyle, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1188 (D. Or. 1998) (rape and abduction victim); 
People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 562–63 (Mich. 1994) (sexual assault of child); 
supra Part IV.B. 
224 This is known as the “plain view doctrine.”  See, e.g., Horton v. California, 496 
U.S. 128 (1990); see generally 2 LAFAVE, supra note 216, § 4.11(b), at 779–806 
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that invasion of privacy is far more substantial than when an 
individual judge conducts an in camera examination of a 
witness’s counseling records. 
In any event, it is clear that a search or seizure by police 
differs substantially from a judicial in camera inspection of a 
prosecution witness’s therapy or counseling records.  
Nevertheless, I believe courts should apply the Fourth 
Amendment probable cause standard.  This standard requires 
that, to secure in camera review, defense counsel must offer facts 
sufficient to establish probable cause, substantially more than a 
mere hunch, speculation, or inference, but substantially less than 
“more probable than not,”225 to believe that the records contain 
information, of a kind counsel can describe at least in general 
terms, that casts significant doubts on the truthfulness or 
accuracy of the witness’s testimony.  This strikes the appropriate 
balance among the conflicting interests involved:  the State’s 
interest in prosecuting the defendant,226 the defendant’s right to 
seek evidence of his innocence, and the witness’s right to 
privacy. 
Employing such a standard would have at least one significant 
fringe benefit:  “probable cause,” although far from precisely 
defined, is a standard with which judges are reasonably familiar.  
Moreover, the types of cases in which courts typically have 
permitted in camera examination of a witness’s counseling or 
therapy records are consistent with a probable cause standard.  
In a rape or child abuse case where the defendant can show that 
the complainant has recanted her227 allegations to friends or 
relatives or has engaged in other conduct dramatically 
inconsistent with her allegations, the strong assumption228 should 
 
(discussing application of the doctrine to execution of a search warrant); 3 id. § 6.7, 
at 479–500; id. § 7.5, at 671 et seq. 
225 See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
226 See supra note 104. 
227 In rare instances the complainant may be an adult male, and somewhat more 
often, a male child.  In the vast majority of such cases, however, the complainant is a 
woman or girl.  Hence, the use of the female pronoun here. 
228 I use the term “assumption” instead of “presumption” because in evidence 
law, a “presumption” has a specific, technical meaning.  A “presumption” is a 
procedural rule that says if Fact A is established, then Fact B is also taken as true, 
unless the adverse party produces sufficient evidence contradicting Fact B.  See, e.g., 
FED. R. EVID. 301.  Here, I propose that if Fact A (recantation or contradiction) is 
established, then in camera examination of appropriate records ensues. 
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be that probable cause has been established that counseling 
records will contain similar evidence.229  The same assumption 
should apply if a defendant can demonstrate that a witness 
suffered from substantial behavioral, mental, or emotional 
difficulties at the time of the alleged crime or suffers from such 
difficulties at the time he or she is to testify.230  Evidence of time-
relevant difficulties in perceiving, remembering, or relating 
events also assumptively establishes probable cause.231 
A showing of probable cause by defense counsel thus should 
be a prerequisite but should not automatically trigger the in 
camera inspection.  The availability to the defense of equivalent 
evidence from less intrusive sources is an important factor in 
deciding whether to conduct the examination, as well as whether 
to disclose information.  In applying this factor, however, a court 
should keep in mind that statements made to or assessments 
made by a witness’s therapist or counselor may have much-
greater persuasive impact on a jury than statements made to 
others.232 
D.  Timing of In Camera Review and Disclosure 
In the typical case, the information in a government witness’s 
mental health records is relevant, if at all, only to impeach that 
witness’s testimony.233  This is so whether the witness is the 
complainant in a sexual-assault or child abuse case, or a 
noncomplainant witness in a different type of criminal trial, such 
as a homicide or a drug conspiracy.  Thus, it is difficult to see 
how a defendant can reasonably claim a constitutional right to 
pretrial disclosure of privileged information in such records.234  
Rather, the timing of the in camera review and resultant 
disclosure is to be resolved by weighing the conflicting interests 
of the witness’s privacy on the one hand, and convenience to the 
defense and efficient use of court time, on the other. 
 
229 See supra Part V.B.2.a. 
230 See supra Parts V.B.2.b, V.B.3. 
231 See supra Parts V.B.2.c, V.B.3. 
232 See supra Part V.B.4. 
233 See supra Part V.C.1. 
234 If the records themselves, or the information therein, are not privileged, then 
they generally are discoverable as a matter of course.  See supra Part V.A.3. 
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Some courts have directed that no in camera review of a 
witness’s records is to be made until after the witness has 
testified on direct examination.235  The advantage to delaying the 
in camera review until this point is that it avoids even a limited 
judicial intrusion into privileged matters until it is unequivocally 
necessary.  As California’s Supreme Court expressed it: 
When a defendant proposes to impeach a critical prosecution 
witness with questions that call for privileged information, the 
trial court may be called upon, as in [Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 
308 (1974)], to balance the defendant’s need for cross-
examination and the state policies the privilege is intended to 
serve.  Before trial, the court typically will not have sufficient 
information to conduct this inquiry; hence, if pretrial disclosure 




At least a few other state courts have hinted at least some 
reluctance to permit the in camera review, let alone allow 
disclosure of any information to the defense, until the trial itself 
has begun.237  Many of the decisions cited in this Article, 
however, do not squarely address the issue. 
 
235 See People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 992–93 (Cal. 1997); Goldsmith v. State, 
651 A.2d 866, 876 (Md. 1995).  Such delay is not without precedent:  the Jencks Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006), entitles a defendant to receive copies of written statements 
of government witnesses, but only after the witness has testified for the government 
on direct.  Id. 
236 Hammon, 938 P.2d at 992 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974)); 
see also supra Part III.A.  Hammon was just such a case.  Prior to trial, Hammon 
sought access to his foster child’s records in the hopes of challenging her allegations 
that he had sexual intercourse with her at all; at trial Hammon conceded that he had 
sex with her, insisting only that he had waited until she was fourteen (i.e., he 
claimed to be guilty of a less serious crime than the top count with which he was 
charged).  Hammon, 938 P.2d at 987.  Thus, his trial strategy “largely invalidat[ed] 
the theory on which he had attempted to justify pretrial disclosure of privileged 
information.  Pretrial disclosure under these circumstances, therefore, would have 
represented not only a serious, but an unnecessary, invasion of the patient’s 
statutory privilege and [state] constitutional right of privacy.”  Id. at 993 (citations 
omitted).  In a subsequent decision the court reaffirmed its rule, precluding pretrial 
discovery or in camera review.  People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 249 (Cal. 2002). 
237 Connecticut’s Supreme Court speaks of a defendant’s right, “out of the jury’s 
presence,” to seek in camera examination of the records.  State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 
808, 841 (Conn. 2004) (quoting State v. Slimskey, 779 A.2d 723, 732 (Conn. 2001)).  
This implies a midtrial procedure. 
 At least three state courts have held that a defendant is entitled to disclosure only 
if, among other things, “‘no less intrusive source’ for that information exists.”  State 
v. L.J.P., 637 A.2d 532, 537–38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (quoting United 
Jersey Bank v. Wolosoff, 483 A.2d 821, 826 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); accord 
State v. Peseti, 65 P.3d 119, 129 (Haw. 2003); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 
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The concern expressed by the Hammon majority is legitimate:  
even an in camera inspection of a witness’s therapy or counseling 
records constitutes a breach of the privilege and an intrusion into 
the witness’s privacy, and sometimes developments during the 
trial may show that a pretrial review was unnecessary. 
But where a defendant makes an adequate showing of 
necessity,238 certainly the trial judge should have the authority, if 
not the routine obligation, to conduct such an inspection prior to 
trial.  Where the records are extensive or the question whether 
to order disclosure is a close one, which might require factual 
hearings outside the jury’s presence, mandating that the judge 
wait until after the witness has testified on direct before 
reviewing the records in camera could require extensive midtrial 
delays. 
Where in camera review reveals information that must be 
disclosed,239 as a rule such disclosure should be delayed until the 
witness has testified on direct.240  But where the records reveal 
information that requires investigative follow-up by the defense, 
waiting until midtrial to disclose it may significantly disrupt the 
trial.  Moreover, postponing disclosure until after the trial has 
begun may seriously undercut defense counsel’s ability to use 
the information effectively.  In this regard, consider Justice 
Mosk’s impassioned concurrence-in-result-only in Hammon: 
Although [a defendant has the opportunity] to cross-examine 
an adverse witness only in the course of trial, to do so 
effectively he may have to undertake preparations long before.  
More generally, to defend himself meaningfully, he must 
 
S.W.3d 554, 564 (Ky. 2003) (speaking of “evidence [that] must be disclosed to the 
defendant if unavailable from less intrusive sources”).  This language also may 
imply that the in camera review should wait until the trial, as only at that point is 
the court likely to be able to assess with certainty whether a less intrusive source of 
the information has been found. 
 Utah’s Supreme Court has recognized that “[i]n the context of a case yet to go to 
trial, the test becomes more difficult to apply because the trial court must anticipate 
the efficacy of the material contained in the records in persuading the fact-finder to 
discredit the victim.”  State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, ¶ 23, 63 P.3d 56. 
238 See supra Part V.B. 
239 See supra Parts V.B.1, V.C. 
240 The analogy to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2006), seems apt.  See supra 
note 235. 
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usually seek out the truth immediately:  He cannot wait until 
the cause is called to trial.
241
 
Indeed, on occasion, review of such records might reveal 
information that would cause the prosecutor to rethink whether 
to press the case at all.  Where the case relies almost exclusively 
on the complainant’s testimony and the records reveal a history 
of false accusations of sexual assault under circumstances that 
bear a striking similarity to the instant case, for example,242 it 
may be that all participants in the case (defendant, prosecutor, 
court, and even complainant) might ultimately be better off if 
the information is disclosed to the defense and the prosecutor 
prior to a trial that, it may turn out in the light of that 
information, should not be held at all.  The same may 
occasionally be true in prosecutions of other crimes, where the 
case relies on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness whose 
therapy records reveal a chronic inability to distinguish fantasy 
from reality. 
To reiterate:  even where a defendant makes a satisfactory 
showing to trigger an in camera review of the records, pretrial 
review and disclosure should be the exception, not the rule.  But 
a judge should have the option to conduct a pretrial review 
where the situation appears to call for it, and, where compelling 
 
241 Hammon, 938 P.2d at 994 (Mosk, J., concurring in the result).  Justice Mosk 
bitterly decried the Hammon majority’s reversal of prior precedent permitting 
pretrial discovery in appropriate cases, noting that while this reversal was permitted 
by U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution, it was not 
mandated, as the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue.  See id. at 1130–31.  
“We ‘should disabuse [ourselves] of the notion that in matters of constitutional law 
and criminal procedure we must always play Ginger Rogers to the high court’s Fred 
Astaire–always following, never leading.’”  Id. at 995 (quoting People v. Harris, 
886 P.2d 1193, 1219 n.1 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)). 
 For those who do not recognize the reference, Fred and Ginger were the 1930s–
1940s equivalent of Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie, only Fred was not handsome or 
muscular and Ginger was willowy, not . . . er . . . Angelina-esque.  Unlike Brad and 
Angelina, who have co-starred to date in only one movie (MR. & MRS. SMITH 
(Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corporation 2005)), in which Brad and Angelina play 
professional assassins for rival criminal organizations who discover to their chagrin 
that each has been assigned to kill the other; happily, several dozen deaths later, 
love triumphs after all), Fred and Ginger made ten movies together between 1933 
and 1949.  Their genre was musical comedy, not movies about shooting people, and 
when Fred and Ginger danced together the audience was transported into a world 
of rhythmic, ethereal beauty.  In other words, come to think of it, Fred and Ginger 
were nothing whatsoever like Brad and Angelina. 
242 Concerning admissibility of a sexual-assault complainant’s prior allegations of 
sexual assault, see 3 FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 41, §§ 19:42–47. 
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reasons exist, should also be authorized to disclose appropriate 
information prior to trial. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Whether a defense attorney should have access to a 
prosecution witness’s psychotherapy or counseling records 
presents a conflict between three highly held values:  a 
prosecutor’s right and duty to bring a suspect to trial, the 
witness’s right to privacy and to avoid exposure that might 
interfere with his or her recovery, and a defendant’s right to 
obtain exculpatory evidence.  A procedure has developed that 
requires the trial judge to conduct an in camera inspection of 
such records to determine whether they contain exculpatory 
information, but only if the defendant first makes an adequate 
preliminary showing that such information will be found.  The 
law governing this procedure, however, is ridden with vagueness 
and uncertainties.  As this Article has attempted to show, these 
uncertainties are best resolved as follows: 
(1) Just as a defendant has a right pursuant to the Due Process 
Clause of the Sixth Amendment to seek such in camera review 
when records are in possession of the State,243 so too a defendant 
must be allowed to seek in camera review of records that are 
possessed by a private entity, pursuant to the Compulsory 
Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment.244 
(2) In camera review of such records must be available 
whether the privilege on its face is conditional or absolute.245 
(3) A judge must conduct an in camera inspection of such 
records if, but only if defense counsel can offer specific evidence 
that establishes probable cause to believe that the records in 
question contain information that casts serious doubts on the 
truthfulness or accuracy of the witness’s testimony, and such 
information is not available from less intrusive sources.246  As a 
rule, the judge should not conduct such an inspection until the 
witness has testified at trial but may conduct the inspection prior 
 
243 See supra Part IV.A. 
244 See supra Part IV.B. 
245 See supra Part IV.A. 
246 See supra Part V.C. 
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to trial where it appears that postponing the review until after 
the witness testifies may require a lengthy adjournment.247 
(4) The judge must release portions of the records to defense 
counsel only if they contain information that raises a significant 
question about the credibility of a witness or the accuracy of 
testimony that is important to resolving important issues in the 
case.248 
The solution I propose has its costs.249  The possibility that a 
judge might review a witness’s therapy or counseling records 
may undermine the witness’s ability to cope with whatever 
experiences or difficulties led the witness to therapy or 
counseling in the first place.  The far-more-upsetting possibility 
is that the fear that such information will be provided to the 
defense may diminish the witness’s willingness to engage in 
therapy or counseling at all.  Each of these results is lamentable.  
The alternative, however, is to increase the risk that an innocent 
person will be convicted of a serious crime and deprived of his or 
her liberty or, in an extreme case, his or her life.  I believe the 
latter is the greater evil, and a more liberal approach toward 
judicial in camera review of such records, coupled with the 
flexible disclosure standard for evidence that may raise a serious 
question about the truthfulness or accuracy of the witness’s 







247 See supra Part V.D. 
248 See supra Part V.C.1. 
249 The current state of the law also has its costs.  In October 2006, I made a 
presentation on this topic to the annual conference of the International Center for 
the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, Inc. in Bethesda, Maryland.  The therapists 
I spoke to knew in general of the possibility that their patients’ records might be 
subpoenaed; several told me that, accordingly, they put as little information as 
possible in the records, generally noting in them only that a patient came to a 
scheduled therapy session and that some progress was made.  They acknowledged 
that this could cause problems during a course of prolonged therapy, and that the 
lack of information in the records meant that if for some reason another therapist 
had to take over the case, he or she might have to start from scratch.  They 
expressed the belief, however, that protecting patient privacy made these potential 
drawbacks necessary. 
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